Fellowship Dinners Australia

The military conflict between the United States and Iran is going badly for the latter which will have dire consequences for the world. This is because an American defeat (or even the appearance of an outcome that is not decisively a win for the US) by Iran will mean that Tehran will acquire nuclear weapons which will undoubtedly be subsequently used against Israel and perhaps other neighbouring Arab countries. The flow on effects of  Iran deploying nuclear weapons in these circumstances are serious to the point that they cannot be overstated.

Furthermore, if the United States does not win the war against Iran by facilitating regime change in Tehran, then a signal will be sent to Russia that it can continue its war of attempted conquest against Ukraine until victory is finally achieved by Moscow. However, if the Trump administration displays effective strength concerning Iran, then the scope for the United States to mediate an end to the Russo-Ukrainian War will be created.

By stark contrast, an American defeat in Iran will also send a message to Beijing that mainland China can ‘get away’ with invading the Republic of China on Taiwan. Currently, the trajectories of war between the two Chinas breaking out and Russia eventually subjugating Ukraine are there because the Americans look to be losing the war with Iran.

The reason that Iran is in this position with the war against the United States appears to be because the Americans are running out of ammunition. The Iranians have been preparing themselves for forty years for the scenario of an American military onslaught, such as is being played out at this time, and so they have ‘bunkered down’ and are now waiting for the United States to run out of ammunition.  There are credible media reports that the United States has expended eighty percent of the Tomahawk missiles that they can make available for this project.  All Tehran has to do is ‘wait it out’ until the remainder of this stockpile is exhausted.

The Trump administration seems to be applying a strategy of subjecting the regime to military pressure in the forlorn hope that Tehran will buckle, particularly in an economic context.  However, the Iranian government is unconcerned about the suffering that its people will have to endure. Furthermore, it needs to be re-emphasised, that the regime’s strategists have correctly calculated that the capacity of the United States to sustain its current military campaign is reaching an expiation point so that victory for Iran over America will be forthcoming,

Therefore, the only viable option now for the United States to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons is to send combat troops into Iran- ‘boots on the ground’.

This measure is only justifiable if the consequences of not doing it are sufficiently dire to justify it – and as pointed out earlier in this article they clearly are!

The application of the ‘boots on the ground’ option will have to be taken with great care which will entail a fundamental change of military doctrine with one that is specifically designed to deal with Iran and in so doing will mitigate casualties.

The strategic strengths of Iran are its geography and geology. It is a huge country with well established, deep, hard to penetrate munitions storage facilities (rockets, drones and enriched uranium supplies among other things) that are embedded in rocky underground facilities over a wide area of Iranian territory. This Iranian military infrastructure is therefore largely capable of withstanding US efforts to destroy or negate them.

However, these specific features could also be turned against Iran and could form the basis of a military doctrine with the potential to defeat it militarily and to ultimately result in regime change.

The geography of Iran provides it with seven immediately adjacent neighbours and a further seven countries that share a maritime border. This makes Iran a very infiltrateable country. The target munitions facilities are spread over an expansive and difficult countryside.

Such an environment makes Iran vulnerable to SAS style infiltration. It demands the deployment of a large number of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) defence garrisons.

The US strategy should be to develop a doctrine that utilises an SAS style reconnaissance and assault force in conjunction with air support and ultimately the deployment of conventional special forces of marines and paratroopers to inflict maximum damage on the IRGC defenders who are located at the sites under attack or who are moving to reinforce them.

The objective is not to take and hold ground.

The objective is to damage the munitions stocks being held at these sites and to diminish the IRGC forces protecting them.

Once completed to maximum effect at any given target, the US forces would be withdrawn and redeployed while other forces are simultaneously directed to other targets to continue to degrade the personnel and resources of Iranian forces.

The aim would be to engage the defensive forces by exposing them to US air and ground assaults as they move from site to site in order to attempt to deal with the various US attacks. Additionally, other groups, such as Kurds, Iranian monarchists and other dissident groups should be equipped and engaged to assist in guerilla activities to further harass and disrupt the IRGC forces.

The overall design of this strategy is to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapons, the destruction of its stocks of missiles and drones and the elimination of the IRGC forces that currently are the means utilised by the current Iranian government to prevent regime change and oppresses its citizenry into accepting the continuation of the ruling theocratic government.

The stakes are so high that the Trump administration cannot afford to fail in Iran.   Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will be tantamount to the regime subsequently using them against Israel and possibly other nations, including the United States and Middle Eastern neighbouring states.

 The Tehran regime has resolved that it must have nuclear weapons to survive. This determination is coupled with a realization that the current American military campaign is ineffective due to Iranian foreplaning.  Consequently, a paradigm shift (as detailed in this article) in American military strategy is not only required but is essential for the benefit of the entire globe (including Iran) and therefore Iran cannot be allowed to acquire much less to use nuclear weapons!

The need for the United States to pursue the objective of regime change in Iran is argued by Dr. David Bennett on the basis that nuclear conflict could well occur on a global scale if Tehran is allowed to develop nuclear weapons.

Sometimes brilliant people are such because they can communicate in vivid terms what must be done. Iran’s refusal to stop its nuclear weapons programme means that President Trump can now publicly argue that the United States has to pursue the option of regime change because should Tehran acquire nuclear weapons they could be used against Israel, the neighobouring Arab states and possibly the United States and Europe. Indeed it does not take a genius to understand that Iran has calculated that it can get away with acquiring nuclear weapons becasue neither Democrat nor Republican adminstrations would pursue the ojective of regime change in Iran given the memories of Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, by the Trump administration placing the onus on Tehran to end its nuclear weapons development programme it is able to call the regime’s bluff. It therefore can still be logically explained by President Trump that for all the economic and military pressure which has been placed on Iran, Tehran still has not abandoned its nuclear weapons programme so that it can be deduced logically that Iran will use nuclear weapons after it acquires them. To help achieve this consequent objective of regime change, President Trump will have to call on the American people to face the appalling consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. At any rate the prospect of the United States being dragged into another `forever war‘ in Iran is erroneous. This is because political and military power in that nation can be rapidly and effectively turned over to the former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. He has the necessary political skills and the requisite popular support base within Iran to lead a successful transitional government which will negate the need for there to be a long-term American-led occupation of Iran. From a military standpoint Iran is a vast nation which is potentially extremely infilitratable so that special long-range operations can be undertaken based upon the Australian and British SAS doctrines. These military doctrines can be judiciously applied and modified by a combination of air power and`boots on the ground`.

By American led forces carefully selecting and engaging Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces (IRGF) held territory across the breadth of Iran, the need to fight the regime on a massive and bloody scale could be avoided. This more selective approach of utilizing special forces to overwhelm the IRGF across the breadth of Iran would shift the miltiary balance in favour of an American led coalition, which includes anti-regime Iranians. After territory is militarily taken by these American led forces, it can be promptly turned over to the forces of the array of ethnic and religous communities within Iran who are hostile to the current regime and would accept a new transitional government led by the former Iranian crown prince. Such a strategy would be to turn the present advantages held by the Iranian forces against them. The installation of a new provisional Iranian government would not only advance peace in the Middle East but also save the world from the terrifying prospect of Iran acquiring and subsequently using nuclear weapons. Furthermore, by the Trump administration promptly preventing such a horrifying scenario the terrible prospect of the now far-left Democrats winning this year’s November congressional elections could also be avoided. Indeed, the mainstream media in the United States is manifestsing its anti-Trump bias by under-reporting the current military conficlt in the Middle East. This is probably being done so that President Trump cannot rally his Make America Great Again (MAGA) domestic base to support a subsequent military campaign to bring about regime change in Tehran. However, any loss of life by US miltiary personnel is being reported so as to set the groundwork for a consequent public backlash against the Trump administraton if military operations are esclated to faciliate regime change. There will however, be plenty of bloodshed to reprort if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. For Tehran will not have withstood American military pressure to date if the regime did not intend to use nuclaear weapns for offensive purposses.

Furthermore, it cannot be expected that threatend nations such as Israel will not pre-emptievely use its nuclear weapons against Iran should Tehran be allowed to continue its nuclear weapons development. The use of nuclear weapons by either Israel or Iran will set a dangerous precedent for India and Pakistan to follow suit and the threat of nuclear weapons being utilized by North Korea cannnot be overstated. The threat of war again breaking out on the Korean peninsula is possible (likely) should mainland China invade the Republic of China (ROC) on Tawian becasue neighbouring Pacific powers such as Japan will not allow this island to fall. Furthermore, Russa’s beleagured President Putin may resort to using nuclear weapons against Ukraine if there is a nuclear exchange in other parts of the world. It should also be pointed out at this juncture, that if the Biden administration had not abandoned the Afghan people to the Taliban in August 2021, Russia might not hae been emboldoned to invade Ukraine the following year. Such is the flow on effect of American neo-isolationism! However, the acutely dangerous potential ramifications of Ameircan neo-isolationism can be avoided by the Trump administraton preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons by facilitating regime change in Tehran. Although President Trump has achieved much during his presidency, the success or otherwise, of his administration might utlimately depend on how he handles the current Iranian crisis. As a political maverick, President Trump can apply the unconventional military doctrines to the contemporary Iranian context and in the process help secure his historical legacy.

Executive Summary

What if the United States is fighting the wrong war in Iran—not because it is using the wrong tools, but because it lacks the courage to pursue the only objective that matters?

This article argues that anything short of regime change in Tehran is strategically doomed, and that decades of failed negotiations have only strengthened Iran’s hand. The article, by Dr David Bennett, makes the case that the real danger lies not only in Iran’s advancing nuclear ambitions, but in Washington’s hesitation.

Drawing lessons from Ukraine and Iraq, it contends that a rapid, technology-driven intervention—combined with a swift political transition—could achieve decisive results while avoiding the mistakes of the past. The alternative, it warns, is a far more dangerous world in which Iran emerges as a nuclear power, with consequences that could spiral far beyond the Middle East.

The current United States military campaign in Iran is likely to fail—not because of a lack of military capability, but because its objective is fundamentally inadequate. Anything short of regime change in Tehran risks prolonging the conflict while allowing the Iranian leadership to outmanoeuvre Washington, as it has done for nearly half a century.

For decades, Iran’s ruling ayatollahs have demonstrated a consistent ability to manipulate negotiations to their advantage, extracting concessions while conceding little. There is little reason to believe that the current round of diplomacy will produce a different outcome. Meanwhile, Tehran’s refusal to credibly abandon its nuclear ambitions speaks volumes. This is a regime that intends to acquire nuclear weapons—and to use them as instruments of regional domination.

The threat is no longer theoretical. Iran has already demonstrated the capability to project ballistic missiles into Europe, and there is growing concern that it may soon be able to reach the United States. The implications are stark: a nuclear-armed Iran would not only threaten Israel, but also destabilise the entire Middle East, including key Muslim Arab states.

Against this backdrop, the United States must confront an uncomfortable truth. If the objective is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, then regime change is not an option—it is a necessity.

The obvious objection is the cost. A full-scale intervention in Iran could result in significant American casualties, with potentially severe political consequences at home. A prolonged and bloody conflict could reshape the US political landscape, empowering opponents of the administration and undermining its broader strategic agenda.

But this is where the nature of modern warfare matters. The United States is no longer limited to the models of Iraq or Afghanistan. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how drones, robotics, and precision systems can dramatically alter the battlefield, allowing for high-impact operations with comparatively lower human cost. If applied effectively, these technologies could enable the United States to pursue regime change in Iran while minimising casualties and shortening the duration of the conflict.

Some level of ground deployment would still be required. However, the scale and risk of such a commitment could be significantly reduced. The objective would not be long-term occupation, but rapid destabilisation of the regime followed by a swift transfer of power.

This is where Iran differs from Iraq. Unlike Iraq in 2003, Iran possesses a recognisable alternative leadership figure in the form of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. A transitional government under his leadership could provide the political bridge needed to stabilise the country quickly, allowing US forces to withdraw before becoming entangled in a prolonged occupation.

Critics will inevitably invoke Iraq as a cautionary tale. Yet this comparison is often oversimplified. The United States did not fail in Iraq because it sought to transform the political system; it struggled because of the complexity of managing sectarian dynamics under intense domestic political pressure. In fact, the eventual transition to a representative system—supported by key figures such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—demonstrated that a carefully managed political restructuring was possible.

The real lesson from Iraq is not to avoid intervention altogether, but to execute it more decisively and more efficiently. A drawn-out, hesitant approach invites both domestic backlash and strategic failure.

This is particularly relevant in the current American political context. A costly or indecisive campaign in Iran could erode support within the Republican base and create an opening for political opponents. Conversely, a rapid and successful operation—enabled by advanced military technology and followed by a clear exit strategy—could sustain domestic backing and reinforce American credibility.

For this to succeed, however, the political case must be made with clarity. The American public must understand that the stakes extend far beyond another Middle Eastern conflict. At issue is the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran and the cascading consequences that would follow.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the likelihood of a regional nuclear confrontation increases dramatically. Israel, facing an existential threat, may feel compelled to act pre-emptively. The result could be a catastrophic escalation with global implications.

The choice, therefore, is not between war and peace. It is between decisive action now and far greater danger later.

If the United States is serious about preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, it must be prepared to pursue regime change—and to do so using the full range of modern military capabilities at its disposal. Anything less risks repeating the mistakes of the past, while allowing a far more dangerous future to take shape.

Synopsis
John Mulholland (1944–2026), long-time leader of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), was a principled political figure whose life combined professional achievement. A teacher, principal, psychologist, and accomplished self-represented litigant, he dedicated decades to shaping the DLP’s direction, particularly through electoral strategy and policy development. Though never elected to parliament, his influence on Australian political discourse—especially in labour rights, economic philosophy, and life issues—was significant. Social Action Australia (SAA) editor Dr. David Bennett honours his legacy and remains committed to advancing the principles he championed.

It is with sadness that Social Action Australia (SAA) reports the passing of John Mulholland (1944–2026), who died from pancreatic cancer in early April 2026. He was the long-time leader of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and a man of distinction—a father and grandfather, and a professional who served as a teacher, school principal, psychologist, and self-represented legal litigant, notably winning an appeal before the Victorian Supreme Court.

While these facets of his life stand as testament to his character and achievements, this tribute focuses on his impact within the DLP, as SAA seeks to continue and build upon his political legacy.

John Mulholland’s association with what became the DLP began early. In 1955, he assisted his father in distributing how-to-vote cards for the newly formed Labor Party (Anti-Communist), which formally became the DLP in 1957. He later joined as a loyal rank-and-file member, regularly attending branch meetings.

During the 1960s, the DLP emerged as a significant “third force” in Australian politics, wielding influence through electoral preferences. By the 1970s, it held the balance of power in the Senate. However, after losing all Senate representation in the 1974 federal election and facing growing competition from the Australian Democrats from 1977, the party’s viability was questioned. A conference in March 1978 narrowly voted to dissolve the party.

This decision was challenged by former Senator Frank McManus, who reconvened a subsequent conference later that year to preserve the DLP. At this continuation conference, John Mulholland was elected Assistant Secretary, a role he held until becoming Party Secretary in 1984.

As Party Secretary, Mulholland applied a rigorous and strategic understanding of electoral preferencing, significantly influencing election outcomes. This was most evident during the July 1987 federal election, when DLP preferences played a crucial role in preventing the election of John Halfpenny to the Senate.

Mulholland believed strongly in the importance of the Senate as more than a house of review—it was, in his view, a chamber capable of shaping the philosophical direction of the nation. It was therefore a missed opportunity that he himself was not elected to the Senate in 1987, where he could have contributed meaningfully to national debate and policy.

He approached public policy through a distinct DLP framework, grounded in both economic and social principles. For example, he offered a nuanced interpretation of Adam Smith’s work, rejecting what he saw as a neo-classical misappropriation that justified anti-employee policies. Instead, he believed that market economics, properly understood, could generate both wealth and full employment, particularly through support for small business.

While a proponent of the market economy, Mulholland also strongly upheld the dignity of work. He believed that all workers were entitled to fair wages and conditions under robust employment laws. In this context, he would likely have opposed the Howard Government’s Work Choices legislation of 2005, which he would have viewed as undermining fundamental worker protections.

Under his leadership, the DLP maintained a strong commitment to labour values and trade unionism. However, Mulholland favoured a more traditional, craft-based model of unionism—one that allowed for greater participation by rank-and-file members.

Perhaps the most defining aspect of his public policy focus was his commitment to life issues. He was firmly opposed to abortion and euthanasia and consistently directed DLP electoral preferences toward pro-life candidates, even when doing so reduced his own electoral prospects.

Mulholland was also deeply concerned with international human rights, particularly in relation to China. He spoke out against the treatment of Tibetans and Uyghurs under the Chinese Communist Party and maintained an interest in broader foreign policy and defence issues, including Australia’s defence spending.

As an educator, he also contributed thoughtful perspectives on education policy, many of which remain relevant in the contemporary Australian context.

Although John Mulholland was never elected to parliament—despite contesting numerous federal and state elections and by-elections—he was, in every sense, an MP: a man of principle. The values he upheld and the ideas he developed through the DLP framework will continue to guide SAA as it works to preserve and advance his legacy.

Executive Summary

As Poland prepares for the possibility of a wider war, a deeper and more unsettling question emerges: what if the greatest threat is not only Russia’s military advance, but the political alliances it is quietly building across Europe?

This article explores how history may be repeating itself—from the partitions of Poland to the collapse of interwar Europe—and warns that today’s assumptions about NATO and European unity could prove dangerously misplaced. The piece, by Dr David Bennett, makes the case that the rise of nationalist forces in key countries like France and Germany may fundamentally reshape the continent’s ability to resist Russian influence.

With Ukraine at the centre of this unfolding crisis, it argues for bold, pre-emptive action—including the potential deployment of European troops to western Ukraine—not only to deter further aggression, but to defend the very foundations of European democracy.

If these warnings are ignored, the consequences may not simply echo history—they may recreate it.

It has been said that Poland is militarily preparing for an eventual Russian invasion should Putin succeed in conquering Ukraine. However, the assumption in Warsaw that a Russian-dominated Europe would still be prevented even if all of Ukraine were to fall to Moscow may prove erroneous. This is because the Russian Federation is currently cultivating tactical and strategic alliances in Europe with political parties which, should they come to power, may also seek to revise European borders in ways detrimental to nations such as Poland.

Poland has suffered from partitions before, most notably in 1795 and, most infamously, in 1939. Concerning the 1939 Soviet–Nazi partition, contrary to accepted wisdom, Poland put up effective resistance to the Nazi invasion and might have fought the Third Reich to a stalemate had the Soviet Union not treacherously invaded from the east. Indeed, had the Soviet Union invaded Poland alone in 1939, an argument could be made that Warsaw might have defeated Stalin.

The fundamental reason why the 1939 partition of Poland occurred so rapidly was the strategic alliance between revisionist powers—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Today, the spectre of neo-revisionism is again emerging in Europe, with Putin’s Russia cultivating de facto alliances with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, as well as with hard-right nationalist parties in France and Germany.

Should Russian-backed nationalist forces come to power in France, Germany, or both, Poles would not need to be warned of the dire consequences for their nation. Under such circumstances, Poland would be unable to effectively counter future Russian aggression—regardless of how formidable its armed forces are—due to hostile revisionist alliances being constructed by Moscow.

Assumptions that NATO will automatically come to Poland’s defence may also prove misplaced if far-right nationalist parties gain power in key member states such as France and Germany. The futility of Poland relying on others was tragically illustrated in 1939, and this pattern could yet repeat itself.

It is often overlooked that Poland mobilised its armed forces in March 1936 in preparation to invade Germany following Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Such an invasion did not occur because France declined to support it. With the benefit of hindsight, Poland might have been justified in acting alone against a then comparatively weak Nazi Germany with the objective of facilitating regime change—an outcome that would have benefited not only Poland, but the world.

Today, Poland may again risk the fatal mistake of waiting for others when deciding whether to defensively deploy troops to western Ukraine. Such a deployment could be purely defensive in nature, undertaken in cooperation with—and with the consent of—Kyiv. It would send a powerful signal to Putin that any Russian advance into western Ukraine would be met by fresh Polish forces capable of halting further aggression.

For good measure, France should also be prepared to defensively deploy troops to western Ukraine. This would not only help block a westward Russian advance into Ukraine—and by extension into Europe—but also serve as a public policy initiative to reinforce the beleaguered political centre within France.

It should not be forgotten that since the July 2024 French legislative elections, the extreme right and extreme left together have held a parliamentary majority. This balance has been used by the far-right National Rally (RN) to bring down successive centrist minority governments.

Les Républicains, the modern successor to the Gaullist tradition, have acted honourably in refusing to enter into any alliance with the RN (although, alas, a hard-right breakaway party has chosen to do so). Whatever President Emmanuel Macron’s personal or political failings, Les Républicains have been correct to cooperate with his Renaissance Party and the Democratic Movement (MoDem) of former Prime Minister François Bayrou. This cooperation is both politically and ethically justified, as not only France’s democratic continuity is at stake, but also the survival of a democratic Europe.

The French Socialist Party (PS) can now follow the principled lead of its former rival by leaving the four-party New Popular Front and supporting President Macron. While it was tactically understandable for the PS to join this alliance to prevent an RN majority in 2024, the party’s relatively strong performance in the March 2026 local elections suggests it is now sufficiently robust to return unambiguously to the democratic centre.

Two of the four parties within the New Popular Front—Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Unbowed and the French Communist Party (PCF)—raise serious concerns regarding their democratic credentials. While Mélenchon has supported Ukraine, his party’s strident positions on other issues complicate the PS’s continued association. Both the PS and the Greens should consider leaving the alliance and instead entering into a parliamentary and electoral coalition with Renaissance, MoDem, and Les Républicains in the interests of French democracy and European unity. For good measure, the French Radicals—France’s oldest party and a politically moderate party—should also be included in such an expanded alliance.

President Macron should be supported not because he is beyond criticism, but because he is no Paul von Hindenburg—the German president who fatally undermined democracy by appointing Adolf Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933. Yet there are unsettling parallels between contemporary French politics and the final years of the Weimar Republic: a narrowing base for centrist parties, disunity among democratic forces, and a naïve belief that the extreme right can be contained or co-opted.

There also remains the challenge of reclaiming electoral support that has shifted to the RN. One possible response would be for a future French Government of Democratic Consolidation, together with Poland, to deploy troops to western Ukraine to form a defensive barrier against further Russian expansion. Such a policy would undoubtedly be opposed by the RN, thereby exposing its role in facilitating, whether directly or indirectly, a Russian-dominated Europe.

Highlighting Russia’s ambitions may also revive in France the memory of Europe’s darkest chapter—Hitler’s domination between 1940 and 1945—and help erode support for the RN. Although Putin’s imperial ambitions continue to be frustrated by Ukraine’s resistance, his broader strategy remains on track due to Moscow’s effectiveness in manipulating international relations.

Having once been victims of Hitler’s duplicity, France and Poland cannot now allow Ukraine to fall entirely to Putin. To do so would risk history repeating itself.