Pilot Democracies
At the time of writing Egypt is on the cusp of a disaster which could set back the cause of peace and democracy for a generation in the Middle East. It is therefore important to review the situation in the hope that Egypt will first make a transition to being a *pilot democracy. That is where a nation has a government with an ambiguous legitimacy that is still prepared for the give and take of political compromise so that a democracy can later be established.
(*The term ‘pilot democracy’ was first used by Corazon Aquino (1933 -2009) who was president of the Philippines between 1986 and 1992 to describe her regime. President Aquino however, never doubted the initial electoral legitimacy of her government).
In retrospect the most eminently successful example of a pilot democracy was Spain between 1976 and 1977 under the prime ministership of Adolfo Suarez. With crucial help support from His Majesty Juan Carlos, Suarez engineered a transition to democracy. Whether Spain’s Iberian neighbour Portugal was similarly a pilot democracy following a left-wing military coup in April 1974 (‘The Carnation Revolution’) and the election of General Antonio Ramalho Eanes to the Portuguese presidency in June 1976 is an ambiguous point.
However, the political turmoil of the 1974 to 1976 period was in itself a transformation for Portugal. This was because the basis of the preceding Estado Novo (‘New State’) which had lasted between 1926 and 1974 was the general apathy of the Portuguese people. Since the professional elements within the Egyptian army supported President Anwar Sadat’s ‘Corrective Revolution’ in May 1971 widespread public apathy toward politics has enabled the Egyptian military to since ‘rule without governing’.
At the very least the delay in announcing the official result of the recent June 2012 presidential run-off will is reflective of uncertainty on the part of ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that is derived from their realization that widespread apathy will no longer guarantee their power. To cut to the chase the military should do a deal with the probable presidential election victor, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Dr. Mohammed Morsi.
Compromise: The Crucial Ingredient for a Pilot Democracy
A deal could be done between SCAF and Dr. Morsi in which the pro-military candidate Ahmed Shafiq is declared the election victor but with the Muslim Brother backed presidential candidate subsequently serving as prime minister in a national unity government. As part of a Muslim Brotherhood/SCAF deal the recent court decision dissolving the *parliament could notionally stand but with the legislature serving as a constituent assembly. The question as to who the prime minister and cabinet is responsible to, the SCAF or the constituent assembly, can be an ambiguous point until a permanent constitution is later put to a popular vote in a referendum.
(*The recently dissolved parliament had previously elected a one hundred member council to serve as a constituent assembly. It is arguably better that the previously elected parliament serve as a constituent assembly so that the Egyptian people feel a sense of connection to a fully functional national legislature).
With Ahmed Shafiq serving as president, Dr. Morsi being prime minister and SCAF undoubtedly having the power to approve the version of a constitution to be put to referendum the constituent assembly will have sufficient incentive to submit a draft that is broadly acceptable to most Egyptians. The relatively small number of politically liberal members of the constituent assembly can fulfil an important role in drawing up a new constitution. Even though the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) had relatively few members in the constituent assembly these monarchist traitors still fulfilled an invaluable intermediary role between the Christian Democrats and the Socialist-Communist alliance in drawing up Italy’s 1948 republican *constitution.
(*Because the 1946 referendum which made Italy a republic was rigged the 1948 constitution was never submitted to a referendum for approval. The fact that the 1946 referendum was rigged was implicitly acknowledged by the 1948 constitution banishing Victor Emmanuel III and Umberto II, their wives and male descendants from Italy and forbidding any constitutional revision of Italy’s republican form of government).
Why The Algerian ‘Model’ Is Not Transferable to Egypt
There may be elements within the military who believe that because the Muslim Brotherhood has a limited but dedicated support base ( Dr. Morsi received five million votes in an electorate of twenty-two million people who voted in the second round) that an outright military dictatorship can now be imposed. Such a calculation is based on the assumption that the de-politicalisation that had underpinned the electoral dominance of the former governmental National Democratic Party *(NDP) from 1979 until early 2011 is still in place.
(*The NDP probably did win the 1984, 1987 and 1990 parliamentary elections. The strong public support that President Hosni Muburak received after Saddam Hussein expelled Egyptian guest workers in Iraq in 1990 enabled the then Egyptian leader to establish a de facto one party state from which to transition to a personalized regime that became the foundation for a family dictatorship after a winning a landslide parliamentary election victory in November that year).
It may be relatively easy for the Egyptian military to now arrest the nation’s Islamists political leaders and disperse their supporters. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has a sufficiently strong grass-roots support base which will serve as the basis for a virulent resistance movement that could plunge Egypt into social and economic chaos similar to what Algeria experienced in the 1990s when the military prevented the election of as Islamist government.
Citing the Algerian precedent may be dangerous because the military there prevailed due to the massive and brutal suppression that it inflicted in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. A fundamental difference between Algeria and Egypt was that the pro-military National Liberation Front (FLN) had an entrenched support base and network going back to the rebellion between 1954 and 1961 against French colonial rule. This network was crucial in proving the Algerian military with the capacity to sustain a terror campaign had substantial (albeit minority) and committed popular support.
Algerian President Abdelaziz Boutefilka’s impressive economic achievements and political reforms since coming to office in 1999 have probably endowed his regime with a genuine support base of about 40% of the population. Should the Algerian military ever allow the election of an Islamist government the FLN would maintain a committed support base which would provide sufficient support to the military to prevent the establishment of an Islamist dictatorship.
The Egyptian military lacks a popular support that its Algerian counterparts had to impose a sustained and brutal regime against its people. Following Gamal Nasser’s 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal and withstanding of an ill-advised Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal Zone the support base of the military backed regime was overwhelming. Nasser still might have later fallen after the momentous year of 1956 due to opposition from a politically liberal middle class and the broad mass of the Egyptian poor that were inclined toward supporting the Muslim Brotherhood had he not instituted comprehensive land reform and price controls on housing rent and food prices.
The support that Nasser had gained was such that after he announced his resignation in June 1967 following the Six Day War massive and genuinely spontaneous demonstrations broke out to demand hat he remain in office that most failed dictators could only dream of. The strong public sentiment for Nasser was such no army officer or clique of officers dared moved against the president. Those officers led by Ali Sabri who were still ideologically Nasserists realized that if Nasser were to die in office there might be a popularly backed military coup against them as a result of the 1967 military debacle.
To protect their positions and power in a post-Nasser Egypt the Sabri clique drew closer to the Soviet Union which was then Egypt’s (or as it was then officially known, the United Arab Republic) main arms supplier. Had the Soviet advisers not arrogantly lauded their power between 1967 and 1972 there might not have later being popular support for Egypt effectively moving into the pro-western camp. This popular support was signified the tumultuous welcome that American President Richard Nixon received on his historic visit to Cairo in July 1974.
With the benefit of hindsight the Sabri clique had Nasser appoint Sadat as vice-president in December 1969 because he was acceptable to the professional elements of the military and to the public at large because he did not belong to their clique. These assumptions were correct but Sabri blundered in believing that Sadat (who was then derisively known as ‘Nasser’s poodle’) was a non-entity who could be manipulated as a puppet.
The 1971 Corrective Revolution: The Egyptian Military Adopts The ‘Model’ of Ruling Without Governing
The underestimated President Sadat surprised all by taking the logical but still daring step of harnessing discontent in the military against Sabri clique by *purging them in May 1971. The political vacuum caused by Sabri’s purge did not result in public calls for political liberalization but rather a renewed focus on avenging the 1967 debacle. President Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet military advisers in July 1972 not only gained him increased popularity but the necessary leverage to compel Moscow to supply military equipment to launch the Yom Kipper War against Israel in October 1973.
(*Sadat was almost unique as a dictator in that he ensured that imprisoned political opponents were well treated and released when they no longer posed a threat. The reviled Sabri was the prime example of Sadat’s approach toward political dissidents).
A military professional such Sadat did not initially believe that *Egypt could destroy Israel but his political and military brilliance was evident when he judiciously agreed to a cease-fire while Egypt was still in a relatively strong military position. The domestic prestige of the armed forces was such that their role in maintaining ultimate political power was accepted by most Egyptians due to their credible performance in the Yom Kipper War.
(*In fact the surprise impact of the co-ordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack was such that Israel would have been destroyed had President Nixon not airlifted emergency aid. Then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was unfairly scapegoated for Israel’s unpreparedness.
It was therefore an act of political courage on Prime Minister Meir’s part that after Israel had gained the military advantage due Ariel Sharon’s audacity that she singularly vetoed further military action by agreeing to the Henry Kissinger brokered cease-fire so that there could later be a negotiated settlement with Egypt. That the ruling Israeli Labour Party surprisingly still won the December 1973 general election was an indication to the then Opposition Leader Menachem Began that it was politically safe to seek peace with the Arab world).
President Sadat still had to gain legitimacy for himself by developing a new political model that was acceptable to the majority of Egyptians. In a political master stroke the Egyptian leader had the single-party Arab Socialist Union (ASU) divide into three factions (which were officially known as ‘platforms’) to run against each other is semi-competitive parliamentary elections in 1976.
Although the president’s Centre Platform predictably won an overwhelming electoral victory there were still important political dividends for President Sadat. Firstly, he was able to formally separate from the Nasserists of the Left Platform while still bringing in middle class figures associated with the pre-1952 era who established tentative links with the Right Platform which they had supported in the 1976 parliamentary elections.
The weak performance of the Left Platform induced President Sadat into believing that it was safe for his Centre Platform to establish a post ASU centre-right political party in a future multi-party republic. The subsequent initiation of market reforms in late 1976 in pursuit of achieving this political objective by gaining middle class support through winding back the now unviable economic supports of the Nasser era precipitated massive riots in January 1977.
The armed forces refusal to suppress the 1977 outbreak of unrest by invoking its role under the 1971 Constitution as the protector of the people was a masterstroke. This was because the nation’s institutional structures (in which the armed forces had an important role) was maintained without the military becoming fatally tied to what could have become an unpopular and personalised dictatorship of President Sadat.
President Sadat’s subsequent visit to Jerusalem in 1977 established the basis for reaching the historic Camp David Accords reached between Egypt and Israel in 1979. That this treaty has lasted is the main factor that helps explains why the Middle East peace process has survived as a work in progress. An important reason for the positive impact of the Camp David Accords was that massive American military and economic aid was provided to Egypt helped President Sadat and his successor Hosni-Muburak to maintain the economic supports of the Nasser era. These socio-economic supports vitally contributed to the political stability that Egypt had between 1982 and early 2011 when Muburak fell from power.
Political and social stability that Egypt had was not only due to the maintenance of the economic supports of the Nasser era but also because of the astute political skills of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Muburak as presidents. President Sadat’s intelligence was such that he knew that he could not remain in power indefinitely. This president realized that massive American economic aid enabled him to help make the lives of everyday Egyptians bearable as opposed to facilitating a substantial improvement in their standard of living that they had expected following the signing of the Camp David Accords.
It was with the objective of political survival in mind that President Sadat centralized power by assuming the position of prime minister in May 1980 and arrested leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the legal secular opposition parties in September 1981. That Sadat moved against this opposition went against the previous trend of his presidency when he had ended Nasser’s persecution of the Brotherhood in the 1970s and legalized opposition parties.
Indeed, Sadat’s resort to arbitrary arrest of political opponents and general political oppression seemed out of character as the president’s 1971 Corrective Revolution had previously led to a receding of Nasser’s police state. In Sadat’s defence, as his former confidants will attest, it should be pointed out that he planned to release political prisoners and lift the state of emergency in April 1982 to coincide with government sponsored national celebrations he planned to mark the return of the Sinai Desert Peninsula from Israeli occupation to Egyptian sovereignty. In this milieu the president planned to hold transparently fair parliamentary elections later that year.
The president was reasonably confident that his NDP would legitimately win parliamentary elections in 1982 due to still widespread appreciation in rural areas for Nasser’s comprehensive land reform programme of the 1950s. Had the NDP won the 1982 parliamentary election Sadat could have voluntarily retired when his second presidential term expired in May 1983. The outgoing president would have supported Muburak’s candidacy in a referendum as the National Assembly’s presidential nominee (providing the NDP still had a two-thirds parliamentary majority) or as the governing party’s presidential candidate.
Political Legitimacy Aborted: The Tragedy of the Sadat Assassination of October 6th 1981
It was therefore not only a regrettable that President Sadat was assassinated in October 1981 but a political tragedy because he had been laying the groundwork for a domestic political scene for a domestic political regime was widely accepted by the people. For a time it seemed that Hosni Muburak had the skills to establish such a broadly accepted regime.
After his presidential inauguration Muburak released the leaders of the secular opposition parties and in a then unprecedented action allowed the Egyptian press to criticize and ridicule him. That the president still had requisite power to censor the press was reflected by his strictly forbidding any criticism of Arab rulers even if they were then hostile to the Camp David Accords. Furthermore, the press were not allowed to make any reference to Muburak’s children who were then leading normal lives bereft of any involvement in either politics or business.
President Muburak’s skill for political liberalization was manifested in the May 1984 when he helped arrange for the officially banned *Muslim Brotherhood to run as candidates of the New Wafd Party (i.e. the Wafd Party, which was alternately the dominant political party or major opposition in Egypt between 1923 and 1952 under the monarchy). A visitor to Egypt during the 1984 election campaign could have been forgiven for thinking that Nasser was still alive and in power because government propaganda invoked the late Egyptian president to successfully scare the regime’s apathetic support base into voting for the NDP. The government fear campaign was based on the false premise that the predominately middle class Wafd Party would return to power to reverse Nasser’s land reforms and price controls.
(*It should also be pointed out that a minority of Muslim Brotherhood unofficially also ran as NDP in the 1984 parliamentary elections).
Had the nation’s cynical middle class turned out in stronger numbers the Wafd Party might have denied the NDP a two-thirds majority in the Peoples Assembly. But then again had regime operatives anticipated a higher middle class turn out, particularly in Cairo, then the government may have resorted to ballot rigging. Overall, the 1984 elections demonstrated what the April 1987 would indicate- that Free Officer rule was viable so long as most Egyptians were apathetic to politics. This apathy was derived from the government effectively maintaining the socio-economic supports of the Nasser era.
That is not to say that there was not political opposition to Free Officer rule or subsequent intermittent repression but in the period between 1981 and 1990. But the legitimate NDP electoral landslides of this period reflected the hopelessness of opposing the regime that was overwhelming tolerated by its people. Consequently most opposition political actors in Egypt (except for the banned Egyptian Communist Party and Islamic Sufists) sought influence through accommodation within regime sanctioned structures.
There was a degree of domestic and international degree in 1990 when early elections were called by President Muburak to gain public endorsement for his *decision to send troops to the Gulf to support the American led coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. There was unusual international interest in the usually staid arena of domestic Egyptian politics was because there was a misassumption (particularly among anti-American Middle East analysts) that Muburak’s decision to support American led international action in the Gulf would end the apathetic acceptance of his regime.
(*President Muburak would not have sent troops to Gulf unless the United States had cancelled massive military and financial debts that Egypt owed as well as providing new credit lines. Until these generous concessions were granted, Egypt had been facing either bankruptcy or the imposition of socially and politically unviable austerity to gain external economic aid).
Instead, Muburak was able to galvanize support for his regime in the November 1990 parliamentary elections that he subsequently transitioned to establishing an autocratic personalised regime. The post-1990 Muburak regime did not become as powerful as the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria due to the professionalism of the armed forces. However, the president’s enhanced power led him developing a defining hallmark of repressive republican Arab regimes- hereditary succession.
It was undoubtedly Muburak’s intention to ensure the presidential succession of his younger son Gamal. This prospect understandably aroused intense fear on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition parties who had reasonably hoped that the military would have select a moderate as Muburak’s successor to again liberalize Egyptian politics. But then again such a hope might have always been forlorn because the military had previously not exercised its residual power to have limited Muburak to a one or two to six year presidential terms.
The Tragedy of Hosni Muburak
As intelligent as Muburak is, his fatal weakness is his personal vanity. The former president should have withstood the prodding from his status conscious globe trotting half-British wife Suzanne to establish a personalized/family dictatorship. Having previously gained the cancellation in 1990 of financial debts that the armed forces owed to the United States, Muburak had the requisite capacity to establish such a regime. The risk that Muburak took in transitioning to such a regime was that the widespread apathy that underpinned the broader Free Officer regime might later be fatally undermined.
The canny Muburak sought to strengthen his regime by turning the police into his personal bastion of support, by utilizing a technologically sophisticated secret service and running an incessant but slick propaganda campaign through the government controlled media based on himself. To a limited extent Muburak also used the NDP as a conduit to establish a loyalist base of support in society. In contrast to other Arab republican dictatorships the ruling governmental party was the main base for hereditary succession as distinct from the armed forces where such an encroachment would not have been tolerated.
It is a pity for Egypt and for Muburak personally that he did not have the character strength of his elder son Alaa who in eschewing becoming ‘Crown Prince’ counselled his father to quit while he was still ahead. Indeed, Muburak could have broadly followed the Mexican formula that was applied between 1934 and 1994 of an outgoing (who was strictly constitutionally limited to one six year presidential term) choosing his successor.
An Egyptian variant of the Mexican model could have been applied by the president in conjunction with the SCAF, the governmental/ruling party and the opposition parties (encompassing the secular opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood) selecting an elite consensus candidate to be the outgoing president’s anointed successor. Such a process if successfully applied could also have helped co-opt elements from the secular and Islamic opposition into the NDP. Such a model of consensus co-option would have been viable in Egypt as it had been in Mexico until the 1990s due to the public apathy/indifference to politics which was partially derived from an initially military regime with revolutionary pretensions successfully institutionally entrenching itself in power.
Missed Opportunities: Egypt’s Free Officers Forgo the Mexican ‘Model’
The wisdom of the Mexican elite ensuring that the 1917 Constitution was adhered to with regard to ban on anyone again serving as president after vacating office was evident when massive demonstrations against Muburak took place in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. These demonstrations were not opposing Egypt’s real rulers since 1952, the Free Officers Union – which now exists in the form of SCAP- but the continued presidency of Hosni Muburak. Showing the professional skill based on objective deductive analysis that the armed forces had shown in 1971 by supporting the Corrective Revolution and by invoking the constitution to refuse to crush demonstrations in early 1977, SCAF refused to support Muburak in dispersing the Tahrir protestors.
Muburak by resigning on February 11th 2011 due to the withdrawal of SCAF support ushered in a period of ambiguity and potential paradox with regard to how and who really rules Egypt. The presidential resignation did not result in SCAF being formed as Egypt’s new ruling junta had previously been in place to collegially represent the armed forces interests in ruling Egypt. The most tangible manifestation of change resulting from Muburak resignation was the armed forces chief of staff, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi has since chaired SCAF which now formally rules Egypt.
Paradoxically, because the armed forces now openly govern Egypt their sixty year rule is now under greater challenge then it previously ever has since Nasser forced Egypt’s first president ,the popular and genuinely democratic, General Muhammad Najuib to resign in November 1954. Had it not been for the Suez Canal nationalization, the subsequent failed 1956 Anglo-French invasion and later socio-economic reforms of the late 1950s/early 1960s a Wafd/Muslim Brotherhood led alliance more than probably would later have brought down Free Officer Union rule.
Free Officer rule since the 1971 Corrective Revolution has since evolved that the military now lacks a sufficient support base (which it probably lost in 1967) to counter- mobilize popular support to maintain its power. The best that the Free Officers can hope for now to avoid a popular revolution is to integrate into a new predominately civilian institutional structure to discreetly maintain their power.
Back to the Future?: Can SCAF Adopt a New Version of Ruling without Governing?
Because Egypt is now confronted by a political crisis there is analysis in the foreign media invariably refers to either the ineptitude or the Machiavellian scheming of SCAF. It is probable that because a constitutional president with the important support of a governmental party is no longer chairing SCAF that its decision making is more collectivist and therefore more divided. SCAF Chair Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi since succeeding Muburak in February 2011 is an unknown quantity similar to what Sadat was between his immediate succession to the presidency upon Nasser’s death in September 1970 and the Corrective Revolution of May 1971.
As military professionals SCAF members are probably calculating what to do based upon probable scenarios. In this context the maxim of the most important civilian minister in another military backed government should be taken into account. The Vietnamese saying that was appreciated by South Vietnam’s Minister for Planning and Economic Development, Dr. Nguyen Van Hung that translates as ‘a good decision leads to a good result and a bad decision leads to a bad result’. Another saying of this brilliant technocrat was that ‘when you come to the bottom of a well, scoop up every drop’.
The essence of these above cited Vietnamese sayings is that when in a crisis draw on what has previously worked as a basis for future action to reinforce the benefit of past successes. The best achievement of SCAF since taking office was to hold the first unambiguously democratic elections since the proclamation of an Egyptian republic in June 1953. The Muslim Brotherhood and their Sufi rivals (who are alternately allies and opponents) had the good sense to run with rival slates that accommodated more secularly inclined parties in the November 2011 parliamentary elections*.
(*There were also run of parliamentary-off parliamentary elections held in January 2012).
The dividends for Egypt’s major Islamist political forces were that their respective support bases were separated from each other while their voting blocs were still enhanced. The Muslim Brotherhood backed Democratic Alliance came first with 44.5% of the vote while the Sufi-led Islamic Bloc came second with 25% of the vote. Interestingly, the Wafd Party garnered 9% of the vote thereby coming just behind their historic rivals the Nasserist led left-wing Egyptian Bloc which received just over 8% of the vote.
That the November 2011 election results were fairly conducted and accepted was because the provisional military government had not sponsored its own quasi-supported political party. This was noteworthy and surprising because the Free Officers had been in one way or another been so entrenched in the power structures since the very unfortunate overthrew of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. That the NDP was dissolved by court order following Muburak’s fall and that the Free Officer establishment did not sponsor the formation of a new successor party was possibly reflective of a lack of coherent strategy of the military to covertly maintain their power.
As with many governmental or Dominant Ruling Parties (DRP) the NDP was a catch-all centrist party which opportunistically accommodated a range of political groupings with avowedly differing ideologies. Accordingly, there were eight so-called ‘off-shoot’ post-NDP parties ranging from Nasserist to conservative that defiantly identified with the *Muburak regime in the November 2011 parliamentary elections. These NDP off-shoots garnered nearly 6.5% of the vote thereby coming a cumulative sixth place in voting percentage terms.
(*Some avowed supporters of Anwar Sadat ran with the Muslim Brotherhood led Democratic Alliance and those who were not accommodated with this bloc ran with the NDP off-shoots).
How and Why Air Marshal Ahmed Shafiq Can Help Navigate A Pilot Democracy
The relatively weak position of the NDP off-shoots paradoxically benefited Muburak’s last prime minister retired Air Marshal Ahmed Shafiq because they rallied to support his independent presidential candidacy as a prominent figure clearly associated with the recently fallen regime. Had it not been for the strategic decision of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority (who constitute over 10% of the population and are the direct descendants of the ancient Egyptians) to overwhelmingly support Shafiq due to their fear of the Muslim Brotherhood he may not have been a viable candidate.
The disqualification of four candidates (particularly Ayman Nour who was the opposition candidate in Egypt’s first competitive presidential election which was held in October 2005) in the twelve candidate race contributed to a lower voter turnout in the first May 23-24th 2012 presidential round which helped Sharif, who garnered just under five million votes, to make it through to the second round to face of against the Muslim Brotherhood’s Dr. Morsi. The overwhelming support of Coptic Christians, Muburak loyalists (who probably have make up 5% in the voting population) and non-partisan Egyptians frightened of the Muslim Brotherhood enabled Sharif to come out slightly ahead of rival Nasserist and liberal candidates in the first round.
The Muslim Brotherhood blundered by calling on Sharif’s disqualification for the June 16-17th run-off on the basis that he was a high official of the former regime. This was a mistake on two counts. Firstly it frightened many secular and some religious Muslims into supporting Sharif in the second round vote on June 16th-17th on the basis that the Muslim Brotherhood intended to establish an autocratic regime. The Morsi call for the disqualification was also a mistake because it caused fear in military circles that a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government as a repressive regime would violently purge the officer corps as Khomeini did in Iran in 1979.
Then again the military’s action of delaying the announcement of the June run-off which was probably a close run affair was similarly a mistake on their part. That there has been a delay in announcing the result probably indicates that Morsi (albeit by a narrow margin due to under half of Egypt’s eligible voters turning out) won the run-off presidential election. From a pragmatic (as distinct from a principled perspective) the military should have allowed Morsi to win the second round on the credible assumption that he would have governed in coalition with secular supporters such as Ayman Nour.
The scenario that now faces Egypt is that if SCAF concedes that Morsi won the second round his supporters will believe that the concession was made due to their threat of revolting against the military regime. A subsequent Morsi government could now become an authoritarian one that is hostile to the military that members of SCAF originally feared. However, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Sufi associates between them probably now have a committed support base of between 15% and 20% of the population which is below the support base of the Assad regime in Syria which is estimated to be 30% which is insufficient to instigate an successful revolution in the short term.
However, the support base of a continuing SCAF regime would be about 5% which is way below the threshold needed to maintain a viably repressive dictatorship. The Shah of Iran before he unfortunately fell in early 1979 insisted that the senior leadership of his secret police, SAVAK, for once give him the unvarnished truth as to his regime’s actual genuine support base was. His Imperial Majesty was intelligent to realize that with a maximum of a 10% support base all the repression he could have inflicted would not have prevented his eventual fall.
By contrast, SAVAK conceded to their monarch that Khomeini had between a 70% and 80% support base. This was due to Khomeini’s success in misrepresenting himself as a Gandhi type figure that was above the fray of power politics. His Imperial Majesty accordingly departed into a permanent exile on the correct assumption that he would eventually be well remembered (if not revered) due to the inadequacies of Khomeini’s incoming republican regime.
The scenarios for Egypt are therefore bleak unless the military makes way from constitutional government. The Free Officers will not be able to gain the support of political liberals, Nasserist leftists or the overwhelming majority of Egyptians who are sceptical toward the Muslim Brotherhood if they opt for an Algerian model of repression. The Muslim Brotherhood also has a lot to lose because they will be pulverised in the initial wave of repression that it is plausible that Egypt will become a failed state that later has a flourishing Al-Qaeda affiliated insurgency.
The United States has a lot to lose if the most populous and important nation in the Arab world becomes an international trouble spot. Even though most people in the United States are wary, to say the least, of a Muslim Brotherhood led government, American public opinion will not tolerate aid going to a violently repressive military dictatorship. Furthermore, the situation in Syria is such that if (and hopefully when the Assad regime) falls an Islamist government may well be elected. Such a government may not be inclined toward being democratic and tolerant if a democracy such as the United States is perceived to be supporting repression in Egypt.
strong>The Potential Transferability of the Turkish ‘Model’ to Egypt
With Egypt at such a crucial juncture in its history there has been a tendency for non-Egyptian analysts and journalists to write about possible future political ‘models’ for this vitally important Arab nation. The problem inherent in advocating models is that as theoretical constructs their viability on the ground may not be viable.
Nevertheless, scenarios with regard to Egypt based the experiences and dynamics of other countries should not be automatically discounted because any option should not be dismissed in times of crisis.
A ‘model’ that has been advocated for Egypt is the Turkish one. This is not surprising because Turkey (and more recently Morocco) have elected governments with strong political Islamist components. These governments are operating in a democratic context due to the formidable if latent external power of popularly supported institutions such as the military in relation to Turkey and the monarchy in the case of Morocco.
Turkey has long being a role model for political reform in Egypt since President Sadat despatched a high powered delegation in 1975 composed of officers, academics and ASU functionaries to investigate that nation’s political structures. Their findings formed a basis for the cerebral Egyptian leader to subsequently embark upon political reform.
The similarities between Egypt and Turkey are that they both became republics due to the power of their respective militaries and the prestige of their armed forces was derived from their role in safeguarding national sovereignty. The major difference between Turkey and Egypt was that the in the case of the former the military genuinely ceded power to its sponsored governmental party which in turn later made way for a secular opposition party that broadly maintained the structures and principles of the republican state that were initially established by the military.
It is true that the Turkish military did openly resume direct control following military coups in 1960 and 1980 and that military ultimatums in 1971 and 1997 forced the resignations of government. However, these military interventions had a sufficient degree of popular support in relation to the military maintaining the fundamentals of the founding republic.
The formation in 2001 of Turkey’s now ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) and its landslide election to power in 2002 seems to have provided Turkey with the viable balance of having a ruling party that is socially conservative in terms of social policy and economically liberal. This combination has been a success for Turkey because the JDP has brought together religious conservatives and political liberals together into a coherent political party. Consequently, political Islamists in the main are reconciled to the existence of a secular republic as are political liberals to being ruled by a party with a strong Islamist influence.
It would be naïve to say that there is not the scope for future political turmoil in Turkey due to its strategic geographical location but at present this is not an evident threat. The viability of the JDP has been consolidated by the *Erdogan government’s pro-western orientation being supported by both secular liberals/conservatives and mainstream Islamists. The effectiveness of the JDP has also been enhanced by the Turkish Republican People’s Party (TRPP) remarkably and thankfully re-emerging as the nation’s pre-eminent centre-left party. That the TRPP is now one of the nation’s two major parties and a centre-left one at that is all the more remarkable because it was originally the Turkish equivalent of the NDP.
(*Although it would be ill-advised, to say the least, for Turkey to join the eurozone, this vitally important NATO nation’s desire to join the European Union should be granted to be a bridge for Europe to Central Asia and to the Middle East).
The Egyptian military has a vital balance of power-role that the Turkish military has had by helping engineer a national unity government with Ahmed Shafiq as president and Dr. Morsi as prime minister or vice versa with the Muburak’s former prime minister returning to that post under a president Morsi. The vital ingredient is that Shafiq be *accommodated with a senior position within a constitutional regime so that a viable secular political camp can be formed.
Such a development could paradoxically later clear the way for a future Muslim Brotherhood government to be elected to power in its own right because a viable secular opposition party would provide the necessary counter-balance to prevent an Islamist government morphing into a type of autocracy similar to republican Iran’s.
(*The military also has to be accommodated in a democratic Egypt. This could be facilitated by the SCAF continuing to represent the armed forces interests by its chairman serving as Defence Minister).
Dr. David Paul Bennett is the Director of Social Action Australia Pty Ltd.