( If the Obama administration insists upon obtaining prior UN authorization to take military action the administration could at least institute the immediate strafing of the Qaddafi regime’s military positions to send a message to the dictatorship not to take further military action againist its people. The strafing option would at least provide urgent relief to the Libyan people and encourage the option of a negotiated political settlement). The reasons why the west must support the Libyan people are outlined in this article by Dr. David Bennett.

The current situation (March 2011) in Libya is appalling because the people of that nation will probably fail in their attempt to free themselves of the Gaddafi regime due to the refusal of the United States and the democracies of the European Union (EU) to provide air support to the rebels*. The mistakes that United States made in Iraq in 1991 have poignant resonance to the contemporary situation in Libya. Had the American led coalition provided air support to cross-communal opposition in early 1991 Iraq probably would have become a democracy in the 1990s. Iraqi exile opposition groups (including Iraqi monarchists) had managed to assemble an alternative provisional government in the Syrian capital, Damascus, in late 1990, to hold the country together until democratic elections were held.

(*The situation is now that bad due to west’s previous failure to provide military aerial support that aerial support for the rebels in holding Benghazi will be required instead of just establishing a no-fly zone).

Ironically the Iranian and Syrian regimes were probably half secretly relieved that the 1991 revolt was crushed by Saddam because as much as these two regimes loathed him they were still weary of Iraq becoming a democracy. Had the United States led coalition supported the Iraqi opposition in 1991 not only would the 2003 invasion have been averted but considerable good will toward America on the part of the Iraqi people would have been generated.

Support for Iraqi democracy was not a strategic calculation for the administration of George H Bush (1989-1993). The peace dividend from the American led liberation of Kuwait was that Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was virtually forced to attend the Madrid Conference of 1992 which paved the way for the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords on the White House Lawn in September 1993 that led to the creation of the Palestinian authority.

Arafat was compelled to take part in negotiations with Israel because American leverage was bolstered by the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. Arafat’s colossal ingratitude to the Kuwaitis by acquiescing to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to the Arab Gulf states threatening to cut off from the PLO unless it entered into American sponsored negotiations with Israel. The Arab Gulf states were prepared to support this peace process because they knew that without the American-led victory in Kuwait Saddam would have threatened the entire gulf region.

A future democratic Libya will substantially contribute to peace in the Middle East because democracies do not go to war against each other. Even in the very improbable event that democracy does not eventuate a post-Gaddafi Libya it is still unethical to allow the Libyan regime to massacre its people which it is already showing signs of preparing to do so.

It is ironic that a dictator such as Qaddafi who has preached anti-American revolutionary rhetoric is now confronted with a popular revolt by his own people that will probably be crushed due to American inaction. The last time the United States took military air action in Libya was in April 1986 when military targets were bombed. This military action was undertaken in response to the Qaddafi regime’s involvement in bombing in 1985 of a nightclub in Berlin patronized by American military service personnel.

Unfortunately civilians lost their lives as an unintended consequence of the 1986 American bombing of military targets in Libya. Now that Libyans are losing their lives in opposing Qaddafi the United States has a golden opportunity to show the Libyan people that America has never been against them but rather their dictatorship.

The 1986 bombing did have the effect of Qaddafi curtailing his support for international terrorism to the extent that until the February 2011 revolt his regime had found a surprising degree of international respectability. This was despite the fact that 270 people (flight passengers, crew and civilians in the Scottish village of Lockerbie) were killed after two Libyan secret service agents blew up Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988.

Given the foreign and domestic excesses of the Qaddafi regime most Libyans are now not anti-American. This is evidenced by people in Free Libya expressing their expectation (which is probably a forlorn hope) that the United States and EU nations, such as Britain and France, will provide military aerial support to the rebels. Indeed some Libyans are now fondly recalling the role of the Allies in liberating them from brutal Italian colonial rule in early 1943. It would be very tragic if the Libyan people become genuinely anti-American because the United States failed them in their time of need.

Furthermore, an American failure to support the Libyan people will also alienate many Egyptians (who should be voting in democratic elections in September this year) and people in Arab countries from the United States. Most Arabs believe that the United States is at best ambivalent about democracy in the Middle East because of a desire to secure a dependable supply of oil. However irrational this assumption may be it could ultimately be vindicated by subsequent American and European abandonment of the Libyan people.

The United States also has a moral obligation to support the Libyan people in 2011 because Washington had discreetly supported Qaddafi’s September 1969 military coup military coup against King Idris (1890-1983) while His Majesty was out of the country. This very unfortunate support for the 1969 coup was due to American alienation from King Idris because His Majesty had insisted that the United States eventually close its Wheelus Military Air Base. (The American mistake in supporting King Idris’s ouster in 1969 became apparent when Qaddafi abruptly closed down this air base in June 1970).

Contrary to popular Libyan opinion it was King Idris who had discreetly made prior arrangements with the Americans for them to close down their Wheelus Military Air Base. The pro-western king’s quiet insistence that the American remove their military presence was derived from His Majesty’s desire that Libya be free from all foreign forces which had been in the country since the Italian invasion of 1911.

If the Libyan people do ever regain their freedom they will hopefully favourably remember King Idris. During King Idris’s reign (1951 to 1969) the three historical regions of Libya, (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan) were administratively united in 1963 thereby fostering needed national unity. In 1949 the future king (who was then the emir of Cyrenaica) helped thwart a proposed de facto 1949 Anglo-French-Italian division of Libya under the aegis of a ten year United Nations mandates for these three nations respectively ruling Libya’s three regions.

The most important legacy of King Idris’s reign was the utilization of revenue from the American lease of the American Wheelus Military Air Base in Libya to re-commence oil exploration in 1959. The subsequent discovery of oil led to Libya eventually becoming a wealthy nation. The king was careful to encourage foreign investment so that the oil extraction could be professionally undertaken. To ensure that no one region of Libya benefited from oil extraction at the expense of another (in stark contrast to the recent years of Qaddafi’s rule) King Idris instituted the previously mentioned local government reforms of 1963.

King Idris’s major abuse of power was that His Majesty banned political parties after the February 1952 parliamentary elections following Libyan independence in December 1951. The 1952 elections were won by royalist independents backed by the king’s Senussi religious brotherhood and Bedouin clans. The only remotely organised political party at this time was the Tripoli Congress Party which as its name suggested was based in the capital.

The Tripoli Congress was the major representative group for Tripolitania Province at the United Nations authorized May 1951 Conference held to establish an independent Libya. This conference was attended by an equal number of representatives from Libya’s three provinces. These delegates designated Emir Idris of Cyrenaica as king of a new united independent Libyan kingdom.

The delegates from Tripolitania supported Emir Idris as king of a united Libya to prevent a return of Italian rule in their province. Those delegates representing the Fezzan region at the 1951 Conference came predominately from Bedouin clans who were keen to end the French UN mandate of their province which had constituted a de facto attachment to French ruled Algeria.

The banning of the Tripoli Congress Party (which was affected by deporting its major leaders) helped ensure that parliament lacked the coherence to govern the country because of the absence of a party system. The frequency with which King Idris engineered changes in government also undermined the scope for Libya to develop a stable parliamentary system crucial to the operation of a democratic constitutional monarchy. Furthermore the king’s botched attempt to abdicate from abroad created the confusion that was crucial in allowing Qaddafi to seize power in 1969.

However King Idris’s achievements in gaining Libyan independence, forging national unity and his nation becoming an oil producing country by insisting that oil exploration be undertaken are accomplishments that can never be denied His Majesty. The king’s regime by comparative political standards (with the possible exception of pre-1975 Lebanon) then and after was probably the most democratic in the Arab world. Had the 1969 coup not occurred Libya might have become a fully democratic constitutional monarchy.

The Libyan royal family greatly suffered as a result of Qaddafi’s coup. The worst abuse that they endured was a mob ransacking their house in 1984 and forcing them to live on a rudimentary dwelling on a Tripoli beach. For reasons that are difficult to decipher (which is often the case with Colonel Qaddafi whose seemingly inexplicable actions always end up contributing to his holding onto power against the odds) the Libyan royal family was allowed to depart for Britain in 1988. In Europe the Libyan royal family has been accepted by the royal courts, such as King Juan Carlos’s of Spain.

The current royal claimant (since the death of Crown Prince Hasan in 1992) to the Libyan throne, Prince Muhammad Al- Senussi, has emphasised that his priority is to help Libya become a constitutional democracy. The role that Libyans are fulfilling in courageously rebelling against Qaddafi is inspiring and reflective that the Libyan people should never have been caricatured as uncritical supporters of their republican dictator who is as ruthless in eliminating Libyans at home as he was of Libyan exiles and of foreigners by supporting international terrorism.

The international respect that the Libyan royal family now has and the fact that they too have suffered as the Libyan people have will hopefully allow them to return to fulfil an important role in a post dictatorship Libya. Widespread usage of the pre-1969 flag during the 2011 revolt is a promising sign that the memory of King Idris and the Libyan royal family will be well regarded if they eventually return to live in Libya.

However the prospects of Libya again becoming free are near impossible unless there is prompt foreign military aerial support for the revolt. The Libyan people have never forgotten that Haiti’s unexpectant and defiantly courageous change of vote at the United Nations in 1949 provided the one vote margin necessary to defeat the Bevan-Sfroza Plan that would have thwarted Libyan unity and effectively perpetuated foreign rule.

Hopefully, if the Libyan people again become free, they will always remember that Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd called for military aerial support to help them. France and Britain* are also distinguishing themselves by trying to gain international support for a no-fly zone. (A no-fly zone is probably now no longer viable due to international delay in helping the Libyan people. International military air action against Qaddafi’s ground forces is now needed if the situation is to be redeemed).

(*The British foreign office has traditionally being pro-Arab since Lawrence of Arabia helped lead an Arab rebellion against the Ottoman Turks during the First World War).

France’s action in diplomatically recognizing the Libyan transitional authority representing the Libyan people is reflective of the principled emphasis that the Sarkozy government has consistently placed in supporting human rights around the world. Indeed many Algerians still remember the courage with which President De Gaulle defied the military and the powerful nationalist right to grant Algerian independence in 1962.

Many Arabs were thankful to the United States (a notable exception was an ungrateful President Gamal Nasser of Egypt) for its refusal to support the 1956 Anglo-French invasion of Egypt following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The United States still maintained cordial relations with Israel despite Israeli participation in the abortive Anglo- French invasion of Egypt. The dividend of American support for Egypt in 1956 came in the 1970s when President Anwar Sadat effectively aligned his country with the United States to sign the Camp David Peace Accords of 1979 with Israel.

It remains an open question if the Libyan people will be thankful to the United States. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has ‘talked the talk’ about supporting the Libyan people but she is still to ‘walk the walk’ with regard to taking practical action. President Barak Obama is a brilliant rhetorician but there is a major gap between rhetoric and reality in regard to the president’s fine sounding words being followed up by military action that is supportive of the Libyan people.

Indeed it is better that the Obama administration refrain from the hypocrisy of fine sounding rhetoric concerning Libya if the administration has no real intention of providing military air support. For all the future verbal and written skill that will be displayed by senior officials of the Obama administration in excusing their abandonment of Libya the historical reality will not be negated in the future as a major American foreign policy failure in both moral and realpolitik contexts.

The Obama administration’s denunciation of Qaddafi and his family could conceal the administration’s underlying reluctance to provide military support. This is because verbal denunciations of the Libyan regime by foreign governments only disinclines Qaddafi and his family from departing into exile. Furthermore from Qaddafi’s perspective why should he go into exile if his regime is in a military position to prevail over the Libyan people?

With regard to the Qaddafi family it should be admitted that Qaddafi’s second son and probable heir, *Saif Qaddafi is intelligent, if not brilliant. His first class political skill has been manifested by his previous success in helping Libya gain international respectability that was once thought to be impossible. In contrast to Hosni Muburak of Egypt’s son Gamal, there was a preparedness on the part of most Libyans to accept Saif as his father’s successor for an intermediary period because he was believed to be a political liberal.

(* Saif sent a message of condolence to Queen Fatima’s funeral in October 2009. The exiled Queen Consort died at the age of 98 in the Egyptian capital of Cairo. Her Majesty, in contrast to her austere husband, was a witty and cosmopolitan personality who normally left a lasting impression on people she met. Libyans who remember their monarchy more often than not do so because they re-call the personality of Queen Fatima and Her Majesty’s personal kindness. It was not surprising that Her Majesty later became a symbol of hope and courage to many Libyan exiles).

When the revolt initially broke out in Libya in February 2011 it would have been smarter for Qaddafi to have made way for his son as his successor (‘Guide of the Revolution’). As his father’s successor Saif was well positioned to have called a political conference of political factions (including opponents of the regime) to establish a provisional government with a Qaddafi component within it. Saif could then have led a Qaddafist party in future elections and in doing so protected his family’s interests in a future democratic Libya.

Instead Saif moved to secure his position as his father’s heir against rival siblings by denouncing the revolt in a televised national address. Saif’s rambling bellicose speech to the nation was virtually a dare to the Libyan people to rise up by warning them that the regime would wreak havoc if they did so. The Libyan people responded by rebelling because they had nothing to lose.

In the early stages of the revolt it seemed that the regime would fall. However Qaddafi shrewdly and brutally first focused on securing the capital Tripoli by using foreign mercenaries to subdue the city. Having done so, the regime is now using better trained and armed troops to march out from the capital to crush the revolt against enthusiastic but mainly amateur volunteers. Tentatively (due to trepidation of provoking a foreign military response) the regime is now using air power to crush the revolt.

The Libyan military is not as strong as what Saddam’s military was in 1991 in Iraq but the underlying dynamic is still the same - an absence of foreign air power to allow a popular revolt to be crushed by a trained army. The only real difference with regard to Iraq in 1991 is that it will take longer for the Qaddafi regime to militarily prevail so that it will be more embarrassing for the international community to stand by as the revolt is crushed.

A strategy that is now probably being employed by foreign leaders is that of expressing verbal moral support for the rebels and making international military aerial support conditional on gaining international authorization from the United Nations and/or the Arab League. Diplomatic temporizing provides world leaders with the necessary alibi to excuse their failure to militarily assist the Libyan people.

Even though the Arab League has just called for a no-fly zone it has done so at a point when this option will probably not save the Libyan people. The current situation in Libya is similar to the situation in Iraq in 1991. In Iraq the first Bush administration enforced a no fly zone in Iraq in 1991 at the point when Saddam’s regime could crush the revolt in the Shiite areas of Iraq without resort to air power. The only beneficiaries of a no fly zone were the Kurds who were thankfully able to establish enclaves along the Turkish border which up until the 2003 American led invasion were a beacon of hope to Iraqi Arabs.

The current beacon of hope to Libyans is rebel held is the city of Benghazi. The residents of this city will undoubtedly put up a strong and bloody defence but it will be to no avail due to their lack of adequate weapons and air power. As the regime approaches Benghazi the international community will make give verbal indications of providing aerial military support but ultimately refrain from doing by invoking international wrangling as the pretext.

After the revolt is crushed, Saif, having secured his position as his father’s successor, will make conciliatory domestic and diplomatic gestures so that threatened international sanctions can be averted. The Qaddafi regime has probably already done exclusive deals with particular customers to access Libya’s oil wealth in the future. Such customers will in turn exercise their political and business leverage to ensure that threatened international sanctions against a Qaddafi ruled Libya never take effect.

The problem with a western betrayal of Libya is that there is going to be a wave of political liberalization in the Middle East. Ironically, anti-American sentiment will be manifested in democratic elections throughout the region if the Americans fail to support a people who have rebelled against a regime that has history of anti-Americanism !

If the United States wishes to secure its position in Libya it should support the Libyan people in establishing a democracy. Valuable steps that the United States could take to support a future Libyan democracy would include promptly linking up with the British and the French to provide the Libyan rebels with air support. The option of a no-fly zone has probably passed due to previous military in action by the international community.

If international aerial support is provided to support the people of Benghazi then the Qaddafi regime will be obliged to negotiate with the rebels to avoid a permanent division of Libya. Negotiations are a plausible option to create a viable interim government because most Libyans have a strong sense of national identity. However those now living in Free Libya do not want to national unity at the price of again being ruled by Qaddafi.

Saif Qaddafi can redeem himself by representing his father in negotiations at a political conference to form an interim government to rule a united Libya until national elections are held. There would probably have to be an international force deployed in Libya to enforce the authority of the interim government. Such an international should be composed of troops from the African Union (AU) and the Arab League but under a United Nations command to safeguard Libya’s territorial integrity. It would be imperative that no American or European nation participate in a multi-national force due to Libyan sensibilities regarding western colonialism that go back to the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911.

The viability of a Libyan interim government and the deployment of an international peace keeping force is now however dependent upon prompt military aerial support from the United States and EU nations. Too much time and too many Libyan lives have been lost due to the previous western refusal to provide military aerial support. A continued failure to do so (regardless of the articulate reasons that will be advanced) will be correctly regarded by most Arabs as a sign of western indifference if not western hostility to Middle East region becoming democratic.

Western nations are understandably reluctant to become embroiled in a possible Libyan quagmire due to events in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the crucial difference is that the political dynamics in Libya are conducive to an interim government without the involvement of western troops. All that is needed is for the back up of western aerial power and Arab League diplomatic involvement to form an interim Libyan government.

Eerily enough the situation in Libya is similar to Iraq in 1991 where had the people on the ground received western military aerial support an interim Iraqi democratically inclined government could have been formed. Although the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are now relieved that Saddam’s rule has ended there is probably still an understandable Iraqi reticence to feel full gratitude toward the United States due to the American failure to support them in 1991. Hopefully such a scenario will not be repeated in Libya.

The Need to Provide Libyan Freedom Fighters with International
Aerial Support

Foreign military action has undoubtedly saved the people of Benghazi from being massacred by Qaddafi’s troops, be they Libyan or paid foreign mercenaries. For this the leaders of the EU, the United States and leaders of medium powers, such as Australia’s foreign minister, Kevin Rudd deserve praise.

The problem now is that Qaddafi is well positioned to hold onto western Libya to perpertuate a permanent division of his country. Already the Libyan dictator is reputated to have met with representatives from Russia, mainland China and India to offer them exclusive access to oil reserves in western Libya. In return for this access being granted these aforementioned nations are being asked by Qaddafi to use their influence to oppose internatioanal aerial support for Libyan rebels on the ground.

In dividing Libya Qaddafi will undo one of King Idris’s major achievements, peacefully achieving national unity. (The other major achievement of His Majesty’s reign was in perservering with oil exploration).

There is contemporary media coverage in the wake of the establishment of a no-fly zone is that Libya will become a quagmire because there are a myriad of tribes and clans. In actual fact Libya has a strong sense of national identity. This was forged in the 1920s and early 1930s by the rebel leader Omar Mukhtar who represented Emir Idris’s interests while he was exiled in Egypt. The 1931 execution of Omar Mukhtar by the Italians generated a strong Libyan sense of national identity without which Libyan independence and national unity could not have been achieved in late 1951.

International aerial support has probably secured the survival of Free Libya in the nation’s east. However the Libyan rebels will not be able to liberate the rest of their nation without international aerial support. The Qaddafi’s regime’s forces are predominately composed of paid foreign mercenaries who are mainly African. There is a smaller Libyan component led by Qaddafi’s close relatives which is adequatley trained and very well armed. Until the establishment of an international no-fly zone Qaddafi’s forces were sufficiently strong enough to crush the rebellion in the east and would have occupied all of Libya had it not been for international aerial intervention.

It should not be forgotten that there was also a major rebellion in the Libyan capital of Tripoli that Qaddafi could not have crushed without the use of foreign mercenaries. Aren’t the people of western Libya also entitled to live in freedom? If Qaddafi is allowed to stay in power in western Libya he will do everything he can to continue to wreak havoc to make his nation into the epitome of a failed state.

To avoid the self-fulfilling prophecy of international aerial support creating a quagmire, military air support should be extended to supporting the rebels on the ground so that they can liberate western Libya. There are two positive scenarios that should eventuate if this military support is provided.

The first is that the Qaddafi regime will fall because international aerial support for the rebels will enable them to liberate their capial and ensure national unity.

The second scenario is that the Qaddafi regime will be compelled to attend an international conference on Libya in which a new interim Libyan government can be formed. This scenario will be similar to NATO aerial intervention in Bosnia which led to the 1995 Dayton Ohio Conference that virtually ended the Bosnian ‘civil war’ (sic). The problem with the Bosnian precedent was that it initially enabled the three factions to consolidate their hold on territory that they respectively held.

To avoid a Dayton scenario an international conference on Libya must produce an impartial interim government whose effectiveness can ultimatley be measured by its success in organising democratic elections. Other key deteriminants of interim government effectiveness will be forging a *professsional army, releasing all political prisoners and ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country to safeguard Libya’s territorial integirity.

(* Establishing a new army will not be that overly difficult because the canny Qaddafi had previously scaled backed the army to avoid a coup).

Foreign military aerial support for the rebel freedom fighters will create the necessary leverage to ensure that the Qaddafi regime attends an international conference to form a new interim national government until national elections are held. Cavets to encourage the regime’s particiapation in an international conference could include granting Qaddafi and his associates immunity from prosecution for agreeing to a political settlement in which a new interim government is formed.

(If an international conference on Libya it will hopefully avoid the Afghan scenario in which the Bush administration restored the Afghan royal family (the ‘Rome Group’) to power in 2001 because of nostolgia for the Afghan monarchy amongst many Afghans. Instead of organising democratic elections which might have resulted in a reinstatement of a constitutional monarchy the deposed Afghan royal family supported the establishment of a self-serivng executive presidential republic which they have since corruptly benefited from).

If the Qaddafi regime refuses to make way for a new interim government formed at international conference then international aerial support should be provided to the rebel freedom fightes so that they can liberate all of their country. The scenorio that must be avoided for both moral and strategic reasons is to allow a subversive Qaddafi regime to linger on in western Libya.

Qaddafi is not a Mad Dog But a Desert Fox

The greatest mistake in assessing Colonel Qaddafi is to underestimate him. As incredible as it seems, the odds are now that he will probably hold onto power in western Libya due to his skill in exploiting international divisions and uncertainity as to how to use military power to support the Libyan people. (Qaddafi could now even re-conquer eastern Libya).

It should not be forgotten that the military coup that a then twenty seven year old Captain Qaddafi led in September 1969 was brilliantly executed due to the skill with which troops were deployed, senior officers suddenly arrested and key communications centres seized. Qaddafi’s skill as a trained signals officer enabled to plan and therefore to lead the coup.

Because he seized power with such relative ease Qaddafi was paradoxically threatened with the prospect of himself falling victim to a future military coup. Indeed, Libya under Qaddafi became a coup prone nation, but with the important qualification that the Libyan dictator developed a particular skill in crushing coups. The coup attempt of August 1975 came the closest of all the previous and subsequent military coup attempts to toppling Qaddafi. The 1975 coup was instigated by six of the twelve officers that had led the 1969 coup and subsequently formed the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The failure of the 1975 coup effectively ended any notion of a collective military leadership and Qaddafi’ s personal power has since been effectively absolute.

Whatever is Qaddafi’s overall mental state, he is bi-polar in a political context. When he is power is unassilable Qaddafi is often indulgently eccentric, erratic and at times even humourous. But when his personal power is threatened Qaddafi has an incredible capacity to objectivley analyse a situation, evaluate his strengths against the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents so that he can subsequently take action to maximize his position to the point that he always snatches victory from the jaws of defeat.

The current 2011 rebellion is a case in point of Qaddafi at his diabolical ‘best’ (sic). Qaddafi had previously sensed trouble which resulted in him scalling down his army to its most reliable elements to prevent a successful militry coup. When demonstrations broke out in Libya in February 2011 Qaddafi caused a widespead rebellion by having his security forces shoot peaceful demonstrations. At this junctue it seemed that Qaddafi had miscalculated because this violent repression precipitated a widespread nationwide rebellion.

It was at the point at which Qaddafi was confronted by demonstrations that were extensive (probably even more than what Hosni Mubarak had been confronted with in Egypt in a comparative context) that Qaddafi displayed his well honed but brutal survival skills. Lacking the capacity to hold eastern Libya Qaddafi utilized foreign mercenaries and a well trained and loyal component of his reduced army to initially focus on brutally crushing the revolt in eastern Libya. Having crushed the revolt in this part of Libya (where there was no foreign media) Qaddafi sent his small but well equipped army to crush the rebellion in the west of the country.

The major problem that confronted Qaddafi in western Libya, was (and still is) that the foreign media had entered free Libya and as such were in a position to film the advance of his troops and report atrocities they witnessed, such as shelling of civilian positions. To avoid the slaughter that would have eventuated had Qaddafi’s forces re-conquered western Libya the United Nations (UN) authorized an international no-fly zone.

The creatation of a no-fly zone by western military aerial action has saved Libya’s second biggest city of Benghazi from being taken by Qaddafi’s troops and probably rescued its inhabitants from being massacred. Although Qaddafi’s military facilities in western Libya (including his headquarters in the capital) have been hit hard by international aerial bombing the Libyan dictator knows that this military action has not really changed the capacity of his military to continue their advance into eastern Libya.

The Libyan dictator will make as much mileage as possible out of the bombing of western Libya, including the unfortunate and unintended loss of civilian life, to create international unease and division regarding the bombing campaign to create a no-fly zone . Indeed once a no-fly zone is established due to the obliteration of Libyan air power, Qaddafi will exploit this seeming defeat of his, to create the momentum for the international aerial military campaign to cease while he continues his successful ground offensive.

Already the Libyan dictator is successfully stalling for time as his regime circulates false rumours that there is going to be a military coup against him in the capital. The dictator believes that world leaders will subsequently recoil from making the appropriate military action to secure either a political settlement or regime change by falling prey to wishful thinking that the aerial bombing campaign will precipitate a military coup.

Qaddafi knows that the main game for him in eventually prevailing is to exploit international indecision and division so that his regime can retake as much territory as possible. The failure of the international aerial campaign to stop the regime’s military advance on the ground will understandably cause division among allies that will imperil the later enforcement of a no fly zone. In fact, if the international aerial campaign refrains from supporting Libya’s rebel freedom fighters then the regime will prevail.

The question that subsequently emerges is what is to be done? The Obama administration has acted honourably by creating the no-fly zone to save human lives. However the Americans are clearly reluctant and uncertain as to how to next proceed in Libya. The French and the British however are not uncertain because they are committed to the the objective of securing an eventual transition to a Libyan democracy.

The aerial military campaign should be placed under French command within a NATO framework because France has a fundamental commitment to achieving democracy and human rights in Libya. American support will still be very important if the aerial military campaign is to precipitate regime change in Libya. This change could be affected by the Americans providing NATO with spy satelite film of Libyan regime troop movements so that they could be targetted by the NATO led allies if the Qaddafi regime refuses to compromise.

If effective foreign military aerial support actually targets Libyan regime ground troops then the rebel freedom fighters will undoubtedly prevail due to the support of far superior fire power. At the very least such a focused utilization of military aerial power could compell the regime to negotiate a political settlement at an international conference on Libya.

Qaddafi should not be dismissed as irrational. Qaddafi is very astute when it comes to the exercise of both political and military power. This dictator will only make concessions when his power is threatened or he realizes that his capacity to gain concessions for him and his family are jeopardized. Therefore even a declaration by foreign powers that UN Resolution 1973 provides them with the scope to assist the rebel freedom fighters by either military aerial support or the despatch of foreign ground troops could be sufficient to force Qaddafi to make way for a compromise interim government. Arrangements for legal immunity for Qaddafi and his children (some of whom could take part in post-regime politics) would be conducive to securing a needed political settlement.

However caution is required with regard to making optimistic predictions with regard to Qaddafi because he has a knack of making his adversaries believe what they want to believe and then getting his own way. A case in point was Qaddafi ostensibly curbing his support for terrorist activities abroad following the American bombing of Libya in April 1986. However the cowardly dictator waited until President Reagan had about a month to serve to instigate the Lockerbie outrage in December 1988 in which 270 people lost their lives.

The sanctions imposed on Libya after Lockerbie economically hurt that nation. But Qaddafi successfully bided his time not only to eventually fend off the sanctions but to make his international position even stronger than what is was before Lockerbie ! Some-one as astute as Qaddafi is well positioned to turn the success of the international military aerial campaign to establish a no fly zone into the point at which his regime consolidates its position on the ground against the rebel freedom fighters. Adroit use (or threatened use) of military aerial power will hopefully allow the international community to snatch victory from the jaws of victory on behalf of the Libyan people as opposed to Qaddafi snatching victory from the jaws of defeat.

Qaddafi is Snatching Victory from the Jaws of Defeat

The rebel freedom fighters were on the brink of taking Qaddafi’s home city of Sirte and possibly of liberating Tripoli until NATO withheld its air support. Despite recent military reverses, due to foreign aerial power, Qaddafi has still refused to compromise. The dictator has correctly calculated that UN authorization for foreign aerial support for the rebel freedom fighters would lapse after his capacity to conquer the east of Libya had been thwarted. As a result, Qaddafi has resumed offensive military actions which could still turn the tide in his favour.

Qaddafi is too shrewd to make concessions until he is actually forced to. At the very least the rebel freedom fighters should be given aerial support to liberate Sirte. The liberation of Sirte combined with NATO publicly keeping open the option of providing the rebel freedom fighters with aerial support to liberate Tripoli could well compell the regime to commit to a ceasefire and/or to attend an international conference (which is tentatively being organised in London) to form an impartial interim government.

However it must be reiterated that Qaddafi will not make the concession of a cease fire unless NATO aerial support for the rebels military action in liberating Sirte is provided. An unpalatable but necessary concession that the international community will have to make to secure Qaddafi’s departure is a public and legally binding undertaking that neither he nor his family members will be prosecuted if they depart Libya.

If the Qaddafi family do leave Libya the regime’s supporters could be left in temporary control of Tripoli. Regime supporters could then send delegates to an international conference to participate in the formation of a new impartial interim government that would re-unite Libya and hold democratic elections.

A precondition for allowing the regime to temporarily hold the capital would be the release of all political prisoners and granting political freedom to Libyans who are not now in free Libya. It should not be forgotton that the people of Tripoli were just as courageous as those in the east of Libya in rising up against the Qaddafi dictatorship. Because the Qaddafi regime concerntrated first on crushing the revolt in the capital, the people in the east of the country were able to free themselves from the dictatorship.

The rebel freedom fighters have not forgotton their debt to their compatriots in the capital and are attempting to liberate them despite adverse military odds. These odds would not be adverse for the freedom fighters if NATO aerial support is provided to vitally help achieve the liberation of Sirte.

The people of the Arab world will not accept legalistic reasons and rationales by the west for abandoning the Libyan people when they are at the cusp of their liberation. Democratic elections are fortunately on the way in many Arab countries. If the west does not now continue to support the Libyan people by aerial back up then extremist political parties may do well in future democratic elections throughout the Middle East due to a loss of western credibility.

Democratic elections in the Middle East will probably result in the election of avowedly Islamist parties to power. This will not be a neccessarily a negative development because such governments could be the equivalent of Christian Democratic governments. A pre-condition for such outcomes is the maintainence of political pluralism. Having fought mightily for democratisation it will be very difficult for forces of depotism to assert their dominance over peoples who have secured their political freedom.

(Most Iranians in early 1979 rallied to support the Ayatollah Khomeini on the misassumption that he was a Gandhi type figure. Had elements of the security forces not defected to Khomeini he would not have been able to have subsequetnly imposed a dictatorship on his people.

If the armed forces are professionally led before and after democratic elections it will be too difficult for new dictatorships to subsequently emerge).

The only democratically elected Islamist government in the world is in Turkey. The Turkish government will hopefully support the removal of the Qaddafi regime as part of supporting democracy in the Middle East becasue the future elections of Islamic democratic governments will substantially ease political tensions in Turkey.

For there is to be a future democratic Libyan government the formation of a succesful interim government in Libya is an imperative. To avoid the Somalia scenario of anarchy (that has occured after the fall of General Siad Barre in 1991) an international conference on Libya must be expeditiously organised.

An international conference on Somalia (which included Somali factions) formed a formal government for this important east African nation, but this provisional government’s formal ‘authority’ has just being that, formal. It is virtually impossible to form a viable interim government if anarchy is allowed to set in or if there is a protracted war. It is in vacuums such as these in Muslim countries, tha Al-Qaeda emerges as a potent military force, as has been the case in Somalia.

An international conference on Libya under the sponsorship of the Arab League could help form a viable and effective interim Libyan government. The prerequisites for a successful international conference on Libya are there. Most of that nation’s diplomats have fortuanately broken with the regime. There is also a critical mass of Libyan emigres who are passionate about bringing democracy to their homeland. Talented members of the Qaddafi regime are also available to make a valuable contribution to such an international conference and to serve in a subsequently formed interim government to ensure that retribution and reprisals do not take place.

Most interim or provisonal governments are often lacklustre affairs that are overlooked by history. Major exceptions were the interim/provisional governments of Hector Garcia-Godoy in the Dominican Republic between 1965 and 1966 and the caretaker government of Governor-General Sir Paul Scoone in Greneda between 1983 and 1984. These governments were eimently successful because they ensured democratic elections were held and that the winning party actually took power. (In a future democratic Libya, office will probably be won by a coalition of parties).

Libya is a nation that has undergone (or more to the point is undergoing) a national trauma due to Qaddafi’s continuance in power. There consequently will be sufficient good will on the part of the Libyan people toward a succeeding interim government that is committed to democracy. The intermediary tasks of forming a professional army, establishing an impartial justice system (also ensuring that a possible amnesty is abided by) and safeguarding Libyan sovereignty and territorial integrity will be substantial, but not insurrmountable, challenges for the interim government so long as it is sincere and determined.

Determination and sincerity on the part of foreign powers will also be neccessary if the Qaddafi regime is to be eased out and the groundwork established for a Libyan democracy. The Libyan people have demonstrated sincerity and determination in fighting to remove Qaddafi. But removing Qaddafi is not the solution to the problem, but rather a crucial step in the correct direction - the direction and solution being that of democracy.

Stop the Carnage in Libya !

The refusal of NATO to provide the rebel freedom fighters with military aerial cover beggars belief ! As a result of this abandonment the Qaddafi regime has managed to rapidly retake ground in western Libya, that by the beginning of next week (if not earlier), Benghazi could fall. There is talk of the Americans and western countries arming the rebel freedom fighters. Why prolong the fighting and possibly create long pyschological war scars in Libyan society?

Instead NATO should cut to the quick by bombing advancing regime forces. This will be more difficult to do because regime troops have formed smaller fighter units and are not using tanks. But aerial
military action can still be undertaken by using satelites to target the bombing of regime combat troops. Indeed the only military action that NATO should now be undertaking is to target those combat troops to incapicate the regime’s aggressive miliary capacity.

As terrible as it is to admit, the Qaddafi regime has a valid point, in that the boming of western Libya has no military or political purpose to it. The NATO bombing campaign is probably having the effect of alienatating Libyans in the west of their country while endangering the people in the east who are not receiving the support that they desprately need and deserve.

NATO aerial bombing of Qaddafi regime combat troops will stop their advance. This will relieve the necessity of untrained rebel freedom fighters risking their lives by fighting against better trained and better armed opponents. A NATO military air campaign against its ground forces will compel the regime to agree to an immediate cease fire and commit to attending an international peace conference to form an impartial interim government that will conduct future free elections.

If the Qadaffi regime does not concede to the above mentioned commitments then NATO should resume aerial bombing to an extent that it induces the regime to make the necessary pro-democracy concessions. Had NATO aerial assistance been previously forthcoming to the rebel freedom fighters in their atttempt to liberate Sirte then the regime would have been compelled to agree to an immediate cease fire from which point a political settlement could have been reached.

There has also been lurdicrous speculation that Al-Qaeda have links to the rebel freedom fighters. This is abosulute rubbish! The rebel freedom fighters have spontaneously assembled and are heroically fighting on ad hoc basis. If they lose because they are abandoned by NATO then Al-Qaeda will have a capacity to move into Libya amongst the remnants of the freedom fighters. Furthermore Al-Qaeda would have a viable recruiting ground because the Libyan people will have been justifiably embittered by their abandonment by the west.

An analysis of Al-Qaeda strategy indicates that this network moves into countries in which there is anarchy and societal breakdown. Western mishandling of the military-political situation in Libya will create the fertile conditions necessary for Al-Qaeda to pursue its usual strategy. A western mishandling of the situation in Libya will generate anti-Americanism across the Arab world which could convert a desire for democracy into support for new anit-western authoritarian political movements. An irony of an American failure to support democracy in the Arab world will be that there will be consequent anti-Americanism in countries, such as Libya, because the west did not support regime change against anti-American dictatorships!

Since the time of his American backed coup in 1969 coup, Qaddafi has being anti-American. This anti-Americanism was principally derived from Qaddafi’s belief that the United States was the major barrier to him becoming the leader of a future pan-Arab state. Qaddafi had attempted to mislead Gamal Nasser into believing that he (Qaddafi) was a young naive ruler who looked to the Egyptian president as his mentor. It was Qaddafi’s intention to unite Libya with the United Arab Republic (as Egypt was officially known between 1958 and 1971) so that he could eventually succeed Nasser as ruler of a new Arab state.

Nasser’s premature death in 1970 and the succession of Anwar Sadat as the new Egyptian president put pay to Qaddafi’s ambition to rule a post-Nasser Egypt*. Qaddafi later still attempted to create a super Arab state with himself as ruler by plotting coups in the region or attempting to bribe other Arab rulers into entering into a union with Libya.

(*President Sadat’s gracious act of granting asylum to King Idris and Queen Fatima in Egypt in 1974 was a signal to Qaddafi to desist from trying to create and rule a newly merged country).

Frustrated by a lack of success in creating a Pan Arab state Qaddafi has also attempted to forge pan African unity. Despite causing havoc in African countries, such as Chad, Qaddafi has had more success in promoting African unity. He has established close links to the Kingdom of Toro which is a part of Uganda that, at a federal level, is a republic. The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the more productive and cohesive African Union is probably Qaddafi’s major positive historical achievement.

Qaddafi’s commitment to African unity is probably reflective of his broader belief (or frustration) that he is a great leader without a great nation to lead. To make his mark in the world as the ruler of Libya Qaddafi supposedly abolished government in 1977 to create a ‘State of the Masses’. In reality the 1977 reforms represented the point at which, a by now personalized military dictatorship, institutionalized as a permanent regime.

The post 1977 regime was supposedly a manifestation of Qaddafi’s ideology, ‘The Third Universal Way’. This is an avowed alternative to capitalism and communism. The major political innovation of Qaddafi’s philosophy for Libya has been the creation of local ‘Popular Congresses’ which are are similar to neighbourhood committees. Qaddafi maintains that his philosphy facilitates ‘real’ direct and on going democracy through these local ‘Popular Congresses’.

At worst these ‘Popular Congresses’ were (the extent to which they are currently functioning in western Libya is unclear) similar to communist Cuba’s now redundant Committees for the Defence of the Revolution in that they monitored, if not controlled people’s daily lives. Alteternatively these committees did actually allow Libyans a degree of latitude to voice their grievances and to have a limited say in running the country. Sometimes there were competitive elections within local Popular Congresses to send delegates to a General Popular Congress which served as the equivalent of a national legislature.

The Chairman of the General Popular Congress effectively served (or still serves) as Libya’s head of state and the Secreatary of the General Popular Congress is the equivalent of prime minister. The General Popular Congress ‘elects’ committees for different areas of national policy and the chairmen of each of these committees effectively serve as cabinet ministers.

Qaddafi’s role in the structure of the world’s only avowedly anarchist state is that of ‘Guide’ of the Revolution, having previously been the ‘Leader of the Revolution’. The Libyan dictator actually takes the greatest offence at being called a dictator. For Qaddafi it is pleasing to his sense of personal sef-conceptualization that his power is derived from public respect for his intellect.

However contestable Qaddafi’s sources of political legitmacy he is objectively considered to be one of the leading poets and writers in the contemporary Arab world. The regime has at times supported the arts and Qaddafi has often allowed the General People’s Congress to decide important decisions, such as a national economic stimulus package, after robust debate.

But only a fool would really believe that Gaddafi has not been, and is not a dictator. The system that Qaddafi devised did however allow for a time to have a safety valve for popular opinion and a gauge to sense the popular mood. At the time of the fortieth anniversary of his coup in September 2009 Qaddafi should have discerned by the surly apathy toward him that the Libyan people had enough of his regime to the point that many Libyans considered him to be insane.

Qaddafi may be eccentric but he is not insane. As mentioned previously, Qaddafi (or smart officials within the regime) ultimatley used the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist bombing to strengthen the regime’s international standing to a position that it was stronger than what is was before the outrage. In a domestic context Qaddafi’s major political success was that he had seemingly secured acceptance amongst a majority of the population of his son, Saif, as his successor.

Saif’s relative popularity was derived from the widespread belief that he could influence his father to act rationally and was himself responsive to other people’s ideas and criticisms. As intelligent as Saif probably is, his father is actually no fool. As such Qaddafi is not someone who makes concessions unless he has to. When the February 2011 revolt broke out Qaddafi shrewdly paced himself to crush the revolt and probably would have carried out a massacre in eastern Libya had it not been for foreign military aerial intervention.

It is now really disturbing that despite the previous success of western airstrikes that Qaddafi is now well positioned to crush the 2011 revolution when all that is needed for the rebel freedom fighters to prevail is targetted aerial military action against the regime’s ground troops. The recent NATO failure to provide air support has provided Qaddafi with the capacity which he will exploit to brutally re-assert his control.

An option that Qaddafi did not exercise (because he knew that he did not then have to) was have Saif step in as a mediator between him (i.e. Colonel Qaddafi) and his people. Had this then occured Qaddafi could have secured his family’s interests in a post regime Libya. To preempt his son fulfilling such a mediating role Qaddafi probably compelled Saif to violently denounce the revolt.

If NATO undertakes judicious military action by incapaciting the regime’s ground troops then Qaddafi may opt for the Saif option. This option could be undertaken from a position of relative strength if a cease fire takes effect with the regime still holding Tripoli. The regime has smart young operatives who could effectively represent the regime’s interests at an international conference to form an interim government.

The local ‘Popular Congresses’ have bequethed the Qaddafi family with a viable support network that they can utilzie to garner a respectable vote in future free elections that would secure their interests in a post-regime Libya. Such an outcome will allow Qaddafi’s political heirs to, among other things, continue to fight to ensure that the Colonel has an honoured place in Libyan history.

Due to Qaddafi’s superb sense of realpolitik he probably does not care how he is remembered by history just so long as he holds onto absolute power. But if there is considered, effective and lateral foreign military aerial support for Libya’s rebel freedom fighters then Qaddafi will be compelled to make way for an impartial interim government. If Qaddafi were to do this then there will be greater scope for his ideas to live on as a dynamic in the politics and in the culture of a democratic Libya.

The irony of the above democratic scenario is that it is reliant upon foreign miliatary intervention enabling the Libyan people to determine their future by forcing Qaddafi to put their interests ahead of his own. But if Qaddafi successfully reprssses his people or Libya becomes an Al-Qaeda haven as a failed nation state it will have been due to the failure of the west to help the Libyan people in their time of need.

Will Misrata be Libya’s Srebrenica ?

Libya would now be free had NATO air strikes been more focused against Qaddafi regime combat troops. This is particuarly the case with regard to the western city of Misrata, the nation’s third largest city. The people of Misrata demonstrated incredible courage in rising up against Qaddafi and in subsequently freeing themselves.

However if Misrata falls there will be an acute danger that Libya will be partitioned into a western and an eastern Libya. There may be foreign powers that secretly favour such a scenario so that they can gain access to Libyan oil. In this context there might be foreign interests that would desire that the Gaddafi regime retake Misrata because it is located in Libya’s north west. Therefore the prospects for a partitioned Libya will be undermined if the nation’s second largest western city (after Tripoli) remains as a part of a free Libya.

Air strikes against regime positions have provided a limited degree of protection to the people of Misrata but the situation is still dire. It is a mystery as to why there have not been more focused NATO air strikes to save the people of Misrata from been massacred. The fact that Misrata has not (at the time of writing) fallen to Qaddafi troops is due to the heroism of its population in resisting the assault against their city.

The massacre that took place in July 1995 in Srebrenica in Bosnia in which the Serb Bosnian army deliberately killed an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslim males was not only horrendous due to the loss of life but also outrageous because the massacre was avoidable. This was because the United States and NATO waited too long to save Srebrenica by bombing surrounding Serb military positions. The belated American/NATO response by bombing Bosnian held Serbia came as a surprise to the former communist regime in Belgrade who believed (despite, or perhaps because of, insipid rhetoric by western leaders) that the west was too indifferent to help the Bosnian Muslims.

The Qaddafi regime however has a more astute sense of the orientation of international leaders than the previous regime in Belgrade that had. Qaddafi knows that western leaders desire a political settlement without having to commit to military action. Therefore the regime is circulating rumours that two of Qaddafi’s sons are trying to broker a deal with the west and/or the Arab League so that there is a cease fire and an eventual political settlement.

As a result of the Qaddafi regime’s disinformation campaign NATO bombing is not being adequatley focused on incapacitating the regime’s military combat capacity. The violent struggle that is currently under way in Misrata is therefore unfortunately favouring the regime because the full force of NATO airpower is not been utilized. Should Misrata fall there will undoubtedly be a massacre of that city’s inhabitants that will be worse then the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.

A Misrata massacre will terminate any prospect of a temporary negotiated settlement by way of a new provisional government being formed because the Libyan political context will become too polarized. There may well be an enhanced bombing of western Libya by NATO as a response to a Misrata massacre. But Qaddafi will use the intensity of the bombing campaign to agree to a cease fire so that he can hold onto western Libya. Cosmetic political changes on the part of Qaddafi’s sons will later be undertaken so that a western Libya to gain sufficient international respectability to sell oil.

The public meeting that Qaddafi recently had with representatives from India, Russia and mainland China was a signal to the dictator’s supporters that he will have guaranteed buyers of oil rule a truncated Libya. Qaddafi’s erstwhile supporters should appreciate that three aforementioned nations already have satisfactory oil supply arrangements that will negate their buying substantial amounts of Libyan oil in a Qaddafi ruled western Libya.

If Qaddafi is allowed to partition Libya then people throughout the Arab world will correctly blame the west. Such an outcome will be ironic because many Arabs, particualry Egyptians, could consequently vote for anti-western parties due to the failure of NATO and the United States to help the Libyan people bring down a regime that was (and is) noted for its anti-Americanism.

Even if Qaddafi holds western Libya it will only be a matter of time before the people there will revolt as they did in February 2011 until brutal counter action (including the use of foreign mercenaries) in early March crushed the rebellion the west. However the social and economic cost for Libya will be too high because the nation will not have the needed social stability to be a substantial oil supplier.

For moral and strategic reasons the focus of NATO air power must be on incapacitating Qaddafi troops so that they cannot re-take Misrata. The moral component of such an action would be to stop a massacre of thousands of women, children and men. Such foreign aerail military action saved Benghazi residents from being massacred and similiar aerial military support will save the people of Misrata from destruction. The moral case for effective military support to save the people of Misrata is self-evident.

The strategic reasons for providing effective aerial support to the people of Misrata are also compelling. For practical purposes a signal will be sent to Qaddafi that he cannot partition his country because the second largest city in western Libya will continue to be free of the regime. In such a context the regime diplomats abroad will have the leverage to pariticipate in meaningful negotiations with the Benghazi based Transitional National Council to form an effective provisional government that will secure national unity and conduct democratic elections.

If the Gaddafi regime were to actually initiate and abide by a ceasefire while it is in a relatively strong military position then it would gain substantial political capital. Therefore figures associated with the regime (including Qaddafi family members) could have a hand in forming a new provisional government, ensuring that legal immunity arrangements are arrived at and having a capacity to participate in future democractic elections.

Liberating Libya

Qaddafi at present (April 2011) is remaining true to past form by refusing to make any concessions. Since his 1969 coup the Libyan dictator has shown a skill in adapting his capacity to match the position that he is actually in. The previous scaling back of his military to being a smaller force directly controlled by both family members and close supporters is reflective of Qaddafi exercising this skill.

The current strategy of using small mobile units to fight the rebel freedom fighters to avoid NATO air strikes is also a manifestation of the regime’s capacity to adopt a strategy that accords with the actual situation. Qaddafi is effectively utilizing what support he has to mobilize rallies to preclude the possibility of there being a negotiated settlement which would compel him to make way for a provisional government.

Qaddafi is intelligent enough to know that his long term position is not viable. The determination of the rebel freedom fighters combined with NATO air support will eventually ensure that the Qaddafi regime will fall. The tragedy of the situation is that thousands of lives could be lost in the process of liberation. It is therefore to be hoped that NATO will adopt an expeditious approach in assisting the rebel freedom fighters.

There are capable officers (who were once belonged to Qaddafi’s army) who are now serving in the rebel army. Coordination between NATO and the Transitional National Council (TNC) should ensure that foreign military air support addresses any shortfalls in the military strength on the part of the rebel freedom fighters. The coordination process between NATO and the TNC’s army probably now entails the latter providing weapons and possibly training to the rebel freedom fighters. Even the temporary despatch of foreign ground troops (until the rebel freedom fighters can permanently hold the city) to save Misrata should not be discounted.

Debate within NATO as to how much support should be provided to the rebel freedom fighters can be resolved according to the following criterion: that NATO military support is commensurate with the objective of facilitating the rebel freedom fighters liberating Libya. Confusion in military strategy usually occurs when there is uncertainty as to what the political objective of a military option is.

The joint letter recently (April 2011) signed by the presidents of the United States and France and the prime minister of Great Britain denouncing the Qaddafi regime reflects that the political objective of the NATO military option is, or thankfully is becoming that of, regime change in Libya. The transition to this objective of regime change has partially been caused by Qaddafi’s refusal to negotiate a political settlement.

The objective of regime change is not the solution to Libya’s problems but rather an important part of the solution, the solution being that of Libya becoming a constitutional democracy. Foreign military support in helping the Libyan people overthrow the Qaddafi regime can be consolidated by assisting a post- Qaddafi Libya become a constitutional democracy. Hopefully the same mistake will not be made in Libya as was made in Afghanistan where the world unfortunately lost interest in a post-communist Afghanistan following the fall of its communist regime in February 1992.

Had the Northern Alliance regime, which immediately took power following the fall of the communist regime, prioritized organising elections then political conflict in Afghanistan could have been resolved at the ballot box instead of via continued fighting. The failure to transition to the paradigm of electoral politics resulted in civil war continuing in Afghanistan which precipitated the rise of the Al-Qaeda aligned Taliban in the mid-1990s.

The American led liberation of Afghanistan in 2001 following the September 11 terrorist attacks led to the installation of Hamid Karzai as leader following the Bonn Conference of December 2011. The various steps that were subsequently taken to confirm Karzai as leader of Afghanistan do not warrant being detailed because the dye was cast with regard to him becoming Afghan leader as a result of the Bonn Conference.

At the December 2001 Bonn Conference the United States supported Karzai as Afghanistan’s new leader because he was the candidate of the ‘Rome Group’, which was composed of supporters of exiled King Zahir Shah, who was then domiciled in the Italian capital. Members of the Afghan royal family (the Barakzai family) and their associated networks became, and still are, a key base of support for the Karzai regime.

Unfortunately the Barakzai family supported Afghanistan becoming a presidential republic so that they could advance their financial interests by being integrated into the nation’s executive leadership. This was despite strong monarchist sentiment in Afghanistan. Monarchist sentiment was evident when spontaneous demonstrations broke out following the final withdrawal of Soviet troops across Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in February 1989 which called for the reinstatement of His Majesty Zahir Shah as king. These demonstrations took place in defiance of the guerrilla leaders who controlled the camps for whom a reinstatement of the Afghan monarchy was, to say the least, an optional extra.

The prospects for Libya becoming a democracy are better due to the spontaneous nature of the revolt that there is a focused determination on the part of the Libyan people’s part that a post-Qaddafi Libya be a democracy. A vital step in both bringing Qaddafi down and helping ensure that Libya becomes a democracy will be holding an international conference to form a provisional Libyan government.

In contrast to the 2001 Bonn Conference that produced the Karzai regime a Libyan conference would hopefully form a provisional government whose members would be forbidden from taking part in national elections to confirm themselves in power. Indeed history indicates that foreign military interventions (in the Libyan context foreign ground troops need not necessarily be deployed, although this option should not be ruled out if the TNC specifically requests it in Misrata) are ultimately successful if provisional governments organise and conduct democratic elections. This was the case in the Dominican Republic.

Not only had the Dominican Republic had next to no experience with democracy since its independence in 1844 but the country had lived under the absolutist and petty rule of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo from 1930 until his assassination in 1961. There was a democratic election in 1963 but the successful candidate, Juan Bosch, was later deposed that year. An attempted loyalist coup ostensibly aimed at restoring Bosch to power led to an American led invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 because this revolt was supported by Communist Cuba.

There were international howls of protest concerning the American led invasion of the Dominican Republic but democratic elections were held the following year, 1966. These elections were successfully conducted because the Americans installed a respected diplomat, Hector Garcia Godoy as provisional president. The American led Inter-American Peace Force composed of member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) operated effectively between 1965 and 1966 because this force took its orders from Provisional President Garcia- Godoy.

The Godoy government was effective because it was impartial and also because it had a means of enforcing its power via the Inter-American Peace Force. Dominican patriotic sensibilities were assuaged because most people were aware that the occupying forces were under the authority of a neutral government whose major purposes were to hold democratic elections and then transfer power to a resulting elected government. President Godoy himself was a canny and cool character who defused many a crisis during his interrogatory period in office.

The American led invasion of Iraq in April 2003 was not as successful as the Dominican Republic’s liberation because a provisional Iraqi government was not quickly installed. As previously mentioned the American led of liberation of Kuwait in early 1991 would have been a comprehensive success had the United States supported Iraqi revolt that ensued.

Promisingly, the different Iraqi political factions assembled in the Syrian capital Damascus in December 1990 to form an impartial provisional government to hold the country together until democratic elections could later be held. Syrian backed Iraqi Baathists within a new post -1991 provisional government could have provided protection to members of Saddam’s wing of the Baathist Party to help ensure that they did not transition to form a base of a future military resistance.

The American led invasion of 2003 encountered major problems following the liberation of Baghdad in April that year because Major-General Jay Garner was dismissed as head of the interim governing authority (the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) in May for calling for an expeditious transfer to a new Iraqi provisional government. Instead power was transferred to a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by the former American Ambassador Paul Bremer.

The cause of peace and good governance in Iraq would have been better served had power being quickly transferred from Major-General Garner to an Iraqi equivalent of a canny Hector Garcia-Godoy. Had this occurred there might have been Iraqi disquiet concerning the presence of foreign troops but this would have been counteracted by the reassurance that an Iraqi government was still in overall charge. Instead Iraqi sovereignty was vested in an American controlled transitional authority. Whatever the inherent merit of CPA policies (such as de-Baathisation) the thirteen month Bremer interlude (May 2003 to June 2004) was a disaster because anarchy prevailed due to Iraqi alienation that naturally ensuring as a result of direct foreign rule.

The truth is that the Bush administration always intended to impose direct American rule on Iraq so that American oil companies could gain control of Iraqi oil. This objective was achieved and helped provide the Bush administration with the fortitude to endure the bloody guerrilla insurgency that ensued because of the imposition of direct foreign rule and the abrupt dismemberment of the former regime.

The ensuing vacuum enabled Al-Qaeda and an underground Baathist movement to move to cause havoc. The American led occupation of Iraq withstood the terrorist onslaught due to the support from Shiite clerical leaders who have links to the Iranian regime. They ironically gave their support to the American led occupation due to their realization that for the first time since Iraq was founded in 1921 that Shiite majority would be in a position to be in power. Bremer therefore ceded power to a Shiite dominated Iraq Interim Governing Council which in turn held democratic elections.

The fact that Iraq is now becoming a viable democracy is due to the support of the Kurdish minority who appreciate that the best hope to protect their rights is within a democratic Iraq. Progress toward genuine Iraqi democracy has been reflected by more equitable oil royalties being negotiated, progress toward federal devolution, a free press and the development of an independent judiciary.

The progress that Iraq has made toward democracy that has been achieved has been undermined because of the previous American decision not to quickly make way for a democratically inclined Iraqi provisional government. Consequently Iraqi politics will be based on ethnic allegiances as opposed to ideological orientations. Furthermore, while the impact of the consequences (i.e. the removal of Saddam and the later development of a democracy) of the American led invasion of Iraq will be appreciated by Iraqis they will probably never appreciate the imposition of direct foreign rule and the chaos that this produced.

In the Libyan context the formation of an impartial provisional government dedicated to holding democratic elections is an imperative if the NATO military action is to have any real meaning by facilitating a positive outcome, i.e. a Libyan democracy. The defection of former Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa creates the scope for an international conference to be held to form a democratically inclined Libyan provisional to both conduct elections, to command a multi-national military force and maintain Libyan sovereignty during a period in which there is a military presence. (An important task of a provisional Libyan government would be to protect Libyan sovereignty over its oil reserves).

Even while Qaddafi remains in power holding an international conference to form a new government should be held to help isolate the Libyan dictator. An important function of such a conference would be to help determine the composition of an international military force to enforce the will of a new Libyan provisional government.

Although Qaddafi will probably refuse to send representatives to such a conference he should be given the opportunity to do so that supporters of his could participate in a new provisional government to protect the Qaddafi family until elections are held. It is an understandable demand of the Libyan opposition that the Qaddafi family (or Qaddafi at the very least) be banished into exile. However, if a provisional government is formed then Qaddafi members would not be allowed to participate in such a government for to do so would preclude their participation in a future democratic election. Because the Qaddafi family would probably want to participate in democratic elections to establish a political base so that they can at the very least remain domiciled in a democratic Libya they would probably accept their exclusion from a future provisional government.

Because of his present military advantage Qaddafi probably sees no utility in ceding power to a provisional government to ensure his family’s participation in future democratic elections. But Qaddafi’s military position will eventually crumble due to the determination of the Libyan freedom fighters, coordinated NATO air strikes plugging the gaps with regard to challenges that the rebels are confronted with and foreign military and logistical support that will be provided to Qaddafi’s opponents.

Qaddafi needs to be as politically smart as what Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea (ROK, i.e. South Korea) and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines were in making concessions that eventually secured their position in the long run. In June 1987 the ROK’s outgoing dictator Chun Doo Wan held a sham convention of his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) to anoint Roh Tae Woo, another retired army general, as his party’s presidential election.

Due to the ROK’s then system of directly electing delegates to a presidential college the ruling DJP’s presidential candidate was assured of an election victory. Roh’s nomination precipitated major riots which the Chun regime could have crushed but the cost would have been too high because the ROK’s trade based prosperity would have been imperilled.

As the DJP presidential candidate Roh cleverly called on the government to introduce direct presidential elections. The executive of the DJP similarly ostensibly acted independently passed by passing a motion supporting direct presidential elections. President Chun’s action in conceding direct presidential elections was a vital dynamic in allowing Roh to legitimately win the 1987 presidential election due to the general perception that he had acted independently of Chun.

In the case of the Philippines the immediate catalyst of President Ferdinand Marcos’s fall from power in February 1986 was due to his abortive attempt to purge his second cousin General Fidel Ramos. Without General Ramos’s support President Marcos could not have imposed martial law in September 1972 and maintained a dictatorship despite considerable opposition. President Marcos still undercut Ramos’s position in the military to ensure his wife Imelda’s succession to the presidency.

When Imelda’s key ally in the military, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver, uncovered a planned attack on the presidential palace as part of a military coup led by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. President Marcos on discovering the plot set a trap for Enrile to crush the coup. The dangerous aspect of President Marcos’s counter move was that he decided to seize the chance to purge General Ramos even though he was not a party to the coup. Had Marcos kept Ramos on side in crushing the Enrile coup then the Philippine president could have remained on course to merge his KBL party with the covertly regime aligned ‘opposition’ UNIDO party (whom Corazon Aquino was forced by political circumstances to very reluctantly run with for president) to secure his family’s interests under a parliamentary form of government.

Marcos lost power because he took the gamble of his life by attempting to purge Ramos. Enrile discovered at the very last minute that a trap had been set for him and in a desperate attempt to save himself appealed to Ramos to join him in revolt. The general would not have done so had Marcos not decided to purge him. Even after Enrile and Ramos had publicly broken with Marcos the president was still in a position to crush them and re-impose martial law.

For Marcos to have crushed the revolt thousands of demonstrators who had turned out in Manila to support the revolt would have been massacred, the professional elements within the military pulverized and the political situation polarized to the extent that the communist New People’s Army (NPA) would have taken power twelve to eighteen months. The opprobrium attached to the Marcos family for massive corruption (as represented by Imelda’s shoe collection) would have been even more intense then what it have become. The Marcos family therefore would have been hard pressed to found asylum abroad let alone to have later re-entered Philippine politics.

To avoid the above scenario that President Marcos publicly overruled General Ver on television when he appealed to the president to crush the revolt by swift military action. President Marcos’s action not only endeared him to many Filipinos but it allowed him to effectively align himself to General Ramos whom he had initially attempted to purge. The next four years of Corazon (‘Cory’) Aquino’s six year presidency (1986 to 1992) were wracked by attempted by military coup attempts that the president was obliged to secure General Ramos’s election to the presidency in 1992 because his support had been crucial in crushing the previous coup attempts.

Because most of the nation’s political clans left Marcos’s KBL party to enter the newly formed, LDP which was founded as the nation’s new ruling party in 1988, Ramos was unable to win the LDP presidential nomination in November 1991. The upshot was that President Aquino was compelled to allow Imelda Marcos and Marcos’s chief economic crony Eduardo (‘Danding’) Cojuangco (who was also the late Cory Aquino’s cousin) to run for president May 1992 to split the LDP vote so that Ramos could win the presidency. Even though Danding and Imelda ‘lost’ the 1992 presidential election their participation facilitate their re-entry into Filipino politics so that they could subsequently maintain their financial and business interests.

The above overviews of Korean and Philippine politics is instructive of how dictators can secure their later political positions by ceding power when the advantage is apparently with them. If Qaddafi wishes to avoid a Ceausescu scenario of fighting to the death and forfeiting any prospect of a political bequest the Libyan dictator should review his approach of losing everything by fighting for everything.

Nonetheless when Qaddafi’s military and political position does weaken there are traps to avoid that the dictator may well set. A possible game that the regime may be playing is to intimate that it is willing to negotiate while it fights on to destroy the rebel freedom fighters. Intimating a preparedness to negotiate allows the regime to raise doubt on the part of foreign powers to support the rebel freedom fighters.

Furthermore it is imperative that there is no definite linkage between an international conference forming a provisional Libyan government and continuing foreign assistance to the rebel freedom fighters. Military assistance to the rebel freedom fighters and foreign support for the TNC must continue until a provisional government is formed along with a viable international military force to enforce such a government’s authority so that democratic elections can be conducted.

A trap that Qaddafi could attempt is to concede to the deployment of an international force to perpetuate a division of Libya. Qaddafi could attempt to exploit his political connections to President Jacob Zuma to attempt to ensure that an African Union (AU) military force enables the regime to hold onto the territory that it holds. The South African Defence Forces (SADF) are too professional to allow Qaddafi to manipulate their presence in Libya to secure his power. Still, great care will have to be taken to ensure that a professional international force is deployed not only so that democratic elections are held but (in contrast to Cambodia in 1993) that the results of the elections are actually adhered to.

The Libyan dictator may think that due to the ancient division of what is now Libya into Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan that he can rule part of a truncated nation. This will not be the case because the people of Free Libya in Cyrenaica know that they could not have won their initial freedom had Qaddafi not had to withdraw his troops and foreign mercenaries from their region to crush the revolt in Tripolitania and Fezzan. Furthermore it should be appreciated that the determination of the rebel freedom fighters to bring Qaddafi down is in keeping with the Libyan nationalism that was forged in the late 1920s and early 1930s in the heroic revolt led by Omar Mukhtar.

As the exiled Emir Muhammad Al-Senussi’s representative in Cyrenicia during the revolt, Omar Mukhtar’s legacy endowed the emir with sufficient prestige to subsequently become king of a united Libya in late 1951. Indeed the strength of Libyan nationalism was apparent in the latter 1940s when the Libyan people opposed the partition of their country into its three historical regions under the Bevan-Sfroza Plan. As previously mentioned Haiti’s vote in the United Nations was crucial in defeating a de facto re-imposition of European colonial rule.

It is therefore fitting that Haiti’s experiences in throwing off a dictatorship be taken into account when reviewing the current Libyan situation. In September 1994 the very unpopular three year military dictatorship led by then Haitian military commander General Raoul Cedras was confronted with the prospect of an American invasion of Haiti. General Cedras shrewdly made a deal with former National Security Adviser and National Chairman General Colin Powell and the then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia in which Cedras acquiesced to the American occupation of Haiti on the brink of an American invasion of Haiti.

General Cedras’s acquiescence was shrewd because American troops instead of arresting the Haitian army general and his cohorts were obliged to provide them with protection against a hostile population. Cedras and his military associates could therefore have remained in Haiti to participate in the 1995 elections because they were enjoyed UN protection. This was not to be the case because the second shrewd action on General Cedras’s part was for him and his close associates to depart into exile in October 1994 to live off the massive wealth that they had siphoned off during their three years in power.

Haiti’s de facto 1991 to 1994 military regime had been a sultanistic one and as such Cedras could not have formed an electorally viable political party or eventually build an alternative anti-Aristide political base. Former Haitian ‘President for Life’ Jean Claude Duvalier (‘Baby Doc’) who misruled Haiti from 1971 to 1986 as successor to his father Francois Duvalier (‘Papa Doc’) who was tyrant from 1957 to 1971 returned to Haiti in January 2011 to take in Haitian politics. Baby Doc may appropriate an anti-Aristide political base due to the personal strength of his French-Italian partner Veronique Roy who has deluded herself that the Duvaliers were (and are) the champions of Haiti’s poor.

The point to savour with regard to analysis with Haiti is that it demonstrates that figures associated with sultanistic regimes can be politically viable after they have fallen. A sultanistic regime is one whose overwhelming purpose is to enrich the dictator and his or her close supporters. Sultanistic regimes generally do not have a solid base of support. Their support bases, such as they are, are usually confined to the dictator’s ethnic/regional group or are derived from popularity that a dictator obtained due to a fleeting political success.

Sultanistic regimes normally fall when broad inter-ethnic and/or inter-class alliances are formed against the dictatorship. A classic example of sultanistic regime was the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua between 1933 and 1979. The Somoza family dictatorship fell as a result of a popular broad based insurrection in which support for the regime dwindled to the soldiers of a still formidable National Guard who could still not overcome popular resistance.

Amazingly the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) are now Nicaragua’s major parties despite (or perhaps because) of their respective corrupt histories. The PLC by ambiguously and alternatively fulfilling the role of an opposition party and an allied junior party during the Somoza era was and is identified with that regime. Even though the PLC is one of Nicaragua’s two major parties the Somoza family have still not being able to return to Nicaragua due to popular hostility because they stubbornly tried to hold onto power by military means.

The Qaddafi dictatorship has generated into a sultanistic regime because power and wealth is now overly concentrated power with the Qaddafi family. Unusually this degeneration has initially served Qaddafi well because he managed to form a formidable new army led by his family that is effectively assisted by well paid foreign mercenaries. In contrast to the Somoza family regime the Qaddafi dictatorship has had sufficient strength to crush the revolt and would have done so had it not being for NATO military intervention. Indeed without continued NATO military support the Qaddafi regime can still prevail.

Sultanistic regimes tend to be non-ideological but they do not necessarily need be non-ideological. The Qaddafi regime ideologically commenced as a nationalistic one with strong socialistic tendencies. These nationalist and socialist tendencies were evidenced by the regime’s closure of foreign military bases, the expulsion of the Italian community and most importantly the nationalization of the Libyan oil industry in 1971. This last action enabled Qaddafi to finance improvements in the nation’s standard of living which probably generated popular majority support for his regime.

Majority support for the Qaddafi regime has now clearly ended. There is still probably minority support for the regime as there are Libyans who, based on Qaddafi’s past successes in raising the standard of living, take his avowedly anarchist philosophy (‘The Third Way’) seriously. As such a Qaddafist type part could possibly poll well in a democratic election and even become part of ruling coalition. These prospects are now diminishing as the regime violently clings to power.

Ideologically the Qaddafi regime claims antecedence from the Omar Mukhtar, even though this Libyan patriot was a stalwart supporter of Emir Idris. Nevertheless, contested historical controversy can be a viable dynamic in a nation’s contemporary politics. Who can legitimately claim Omar Mukhtar’s mantle could become a matter of keen political dispute in a democratic Libya. However if Qaddafi persists in clinging to power he may become an Arab version of Somoza with the historical mantle of Rodolfo Graziani, the brutal Italian Governor of Libya who had Omar Mukhtar executed in 1931.

Misrata and the ‘Chindits’ Option

The litmus test as to whether Qaddafi will militarily prevail or make way for a democratically inclined provisional government will be determined in the battle for Misrata. If Misrata falls to regime troops (which are predominantly foreign mercenaries) then the population of that city will probably be massacred. This will not only be a terrible loss of human life but such an outcome will enable the Qaddafi regime to hold onto the west of the country because Misrata is a key western city.

Regime apologists/propagandists will claim that no massacre took place but Libyans in the east of the country will know better and understandably refuse to enter into any negotiations to reach a political settlement, thereby solidifying the permanent division of Libya, unless foreign fecklessness is such that a blind eye is turned to Qaddafi reconquering the western Libya.

Considering the relative lack of outrage in western countries toward the regime’s excesses it is not an unreasonable supposition on Qaddafi’s part that he could get away with massacring communities who previously opposed him. When Indonesian backed East Timorese militias massacred their fellow countrymen in October and November 1999 with the plausible threat that the majority of East Timor’s population would be killed left wingers in Australia understandably took to the streets to demand that the neo-liberal Howard government take military action to save East Timor*.

(To its credit the Howard government’s threat in 1999 to take military action to rescue the people of East Timor did actually save the situation. Australian peace keeping troops were subsequently deployed to help secure East Timor’s independence. Even though the Howard government’s actions saved East Timor - in contrast to the Whitlam government which betrayed the East Timorese in 1975 - the left never gave the former coalition government the positive recognition that it deserved for rescuing East Timor).

If a right wing dictator such as the late Augusto Pinochet of Chile massacred (or had threatened to massacre) his people there would have been massive demonstrations around the world. But in the case of Libya there are no discernibly substantial demonstrations denouncing Qaddafi or calling on help for the Libyan people. Indeed, the American, British and French governments are seemingly anxious that if they increase military assistance to the rebel freedom fighter or deploy ground troops to rescue the people of Misrata (and only Misrata) then there will be outcry of opposition in their home countries with ‘anti-war’ demonstrations being held.

British Prime Minister David Cameron has however has conveyed a reluctance to despatch ground troops to Misrata for fear of there being a domestic backlash following the deployment of British combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. However it can be said that had foreign troops being deployed in Rwanda in 1994 to save its Hutu minority (an estimated 800,000 of whom were killed in a four month period in 1994) from being exterminated that no-one in France or the United States could have plausibly objected on humanitarian grounds*. Consequently the question must be asked as why and how could there be valid opposition to British or French troops being deployed in Misrata if they are actually needed?

(*As it was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) thankfully prevailed. Had this not been the case it is too frightening to contemplate if foreign troops would have been sent to save the situation).

The British prime minister has declared his sympathy for the Libyan people but only offered to provide ‘non-lethal aid’ to the rebel freedom fighters. Such self-imposed limitations of support embolden Qaddafi to persist in using cluster bombs against the people of Misrata! Even official regime spokesmen have emphatically denied that cluster bombs are being used in Misrata. This is more than their being disingenuous but a calculated attempt at plausible denial so that there can be a fall back option for a cease-fire and a consequent political settlement.

Someone as tactically and strategically brilliant as Qaddafi knows that if he can get a way with taking Misrata and massacring its inhabitants any prospect of a negotiated settlement will be thwarted. Under such a terrible scenario Qaddafi will appreciate that he will be able to hold onto absolute power in western Libya with the distinct prospect of his retaking all of eastern Libya. This outcome will not only be disastrous for the people of Libya but detrimental to western interests because Arab opinion will be justifiably alienated from a negligent west.

Ideally it would be best if either an African Union (AU) or Arab League (AL) force is quickly despatched to Misrata (and only Misrata) with NATO support to save its inhabitants. However time is of the essence with regard to rescuing Misrata. The current dilemma with regard to this city is that NATO air power is ineffective due to the mobility of lightly but lethally armed regime troops.

Considering that time is now of the essence the British and French should consider the ‘Chindits option’. This military option was utilized in the Burma campaign by Anglo-Indian forces (‘long range penetration units’) landing in enemy held territory and being supplied by air. The Libyan context is different in that Misrata is not ‘enemy territory’ but Chindits principles are still applicable: that of a mobile force being despatched to hold valuable territory and possessing the capacity to make an expeditious withdrawal when required.

In the Misrata context an Anglo-Franco withdrawal would occur when either rebel freedom fighters and/or AU/AL moves into the vacuum. The equivalent of a contemporary Anglo-Franco Chindits unit(s) would probably confront a predominately foreign mercenary force that is only motivated to fight when certainty of victory is near assured, as is the contemporary situation with regard to Misrata.

President Obama has said that Qaddafi’s days in power are numbered due to the success in sequestering 35 billion American dollars of the dictator’s personal fortune. This is an important victory because Qaddafi may be deprived of some of his capacity to pay his troops. There is however an implicit assumption, if not commitment, on President Obama’s part that American military aid will be sent to the rebel freedom fighters to ensure their victory.

But victory for the rebel freedom fighters may come too late for the people of Misrata. Furthermore it morally wrong to unnecessarily prolong the agony of the Libyan people by having rebel freedom fighters engage in bloody combat over a prolonged period of time which could be shortened by foreign military support.

The major sources of Qaddafi’s military strength are foreign mercenaries (whom the regime is apparently still in a position to pay) and troops drawn from the Warfalla, Maghara and Qadhafa clans, the last mentioned being Qaddafi’s clan. These aforementioned clans do not have the requisite military strength or inclination to oppose foreign combat troops.

The commitment of these clans to the Qaddafi regime is derived from their now being its administrative backbone and having subsequent access to wealth and patronage. These clans also fear that they would disproportionately suffer if Qaddafi was to fall. But even if Qaddafi were to military prevail, the long term ascendancy of these clans would be threatened by an oil embargo that would be imposed on an internationally ostracized Libya.

Effective Anglo-Franco military assistance by utilizing the ‘Chindits’ option in regard to saving the people of Misrata would be beneficial on two levels. Firstly, it would send a practical message to the three support clans that some of their talented members should support the establishment of and participate in a post-Qaddafi provisional government of national unity.

The second advantage of the ‘Chindits’ option would that it will be conducive to a prompt military withdrawal so as to avoid an Afghan or Iraqi quagmire. This will particularly be the case because a ‘Chindits’ option is by definition confined to a prescribed area of operation for a limited period of time.

The ‘Chindits’ option or approach was primarily devised by a brilliant and an unorthodox British General, Orde Wingate (1903 to 1944). General Wingate fulfilled a key role in liberating another former Italian ‘colony’, Abyssinia (as Ethiopia was then known) between 1940 and 1941. General Wingate was understandably appalled at an initial British reluctance to restore full sovereignty to Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie who was a personal hero of the general’s. General Wingate did help ensure that full Ethiopian independence was promptly restored that his North African military campaign became a political success.

Unfortunately, Haile Selassie’s reign did not end successfully with His Imperial Majesty’s being deposed in 1974 and probably murdered in a regicide in January 1975. For all the Emperor’s impressive achievements His Imperial Majesty allowed sycophants to cut him off from reality so that he lost perspective as to what his actual situation was.

Whatever Qaddafi’s failings he has never lost his sense of realpolitik. The Libyan dictator therefore will only cede power if and when circumstances warrant it. At present military situation is such that Qaddafi will not cede power to a provisional government of national unity due to western uncertainty as to how to effectively apply military power.

If the situation was to change due to a contemporary Anglo-Franco application of Chindits military option not only would Misrata be saved but Libya would be spared a protracted civil war that could alienate potential Arab good will toward the west as the Middle East moves towards democracy. The achievement of democracy is not an impossibility in nations or regions that have not traditionally enjoyed this form of government.

Since 1994 post-apartheid South Africa has been an example of how democracy can flourish in a nation that did not have a genuine democratic tradition and which still has deep ceded economic and social problems. The South African achievement is partly due to the remarkable leadership of Nelson Mandela who served as post- apartheid South Africa’s first president between 1994 and 1999. It is therefore now fitting that Mandela is rightly regarded as one of history’s great statesmen.

Probably the most admired African in the twentieth century before Nelson Mandela was Emperor Haile Selassie due to his dignity and heroism in opposing the Italian invasion of his country between 1935 and 1936. The late Emperor may still receive eventual historical vindication but Nelson Mandela’s positive place in history is assured.

Even President Mandela’s decision to receive Qaddafi in the South African president’s last days in office did not besmirch his integrity. For Nelson Mandela it was impossible to ostracize Qaddafi because he had been such a stalwart supporter of South Africa’s liberation struggle. It would therefore be appropriate if Qaddafi were to go into exile that his exile is a South African one because this would help synthesize this nation’s past historical and contemporary roles in advancing democracy. By granting Qaddafi asylum South Africa would be honouring a national leader who supported their struggle for freedom while helping his people achieve their freedom.

But for South Africa to be of assistance in helping the Libyan people to achieve their freedom it may be necessary for countries such as the United States, Britain and France to provide military assistance to the Libyan people. Democracy and freedom are desired outcomes and those who commit to supporting people and nations who suffer under oppression achieve liberty have a moral obligation to honour their verbal undertaking with effective action. Fulfilling moral obligations also have practical and strategic ramifications in this globalized world.

Why the Al- Qaeda Red Herring must not become a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Libya

Specific American NATO military air support against Qaddafi regime artillery and troops in the vicinity of Misrata must be praised because it has helped avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. The action of American Senator John Mc Cain in recently (April 2011) visiting Misrata in the midst of the fighting was courageous and moving. The Mc Cain visit is hopefully reflective of the intention of NATO (with specialized American backup) to provide the Libyan rebel freedom fighters with sufficient arms, training and air support to liberate all of Libya if Gaddafi refuses to make way for an impartial democratically inclined provisional government.

It should be emphasised that in a military context Misrata is still not fully secured. The Qaddafi regime has resorted to sophistry by claiming that it has withdrawn its troops from Misrata in favour of ‘tribal’ troops resident in the surrounding area. The troops that are continuing the attacks on Misrata are regime soldiers and foreign mercenaries who are now dressed in civilian clothes. That the regime continues its attack on Misrata despite recent military reverses due to NATO air support by using mobile units is reflective of Qaddafi’s calculated refusal to concede unless the situation actually warrants it.

Previous events in Libyan history, such as his successes in crushing countless military coups, reflect that Qaddafi’s contemporary defiance is not bravado but a realistic assessment of his capacity to impose his will and/or master a challenging situation. The Libyan dictator knows that the real test that confronts NATO is not only that of providing continuing aerial support to the rebel freedom fighters but also of arming and training the rebel freedom fighters so that they can use Misrata (which is in geographical proximity to the Libyan capital) as their base to liberate Tripoli.

To prevent NATO countries from undertaking the necessary sustained military support to the rebel freedom fighters the Qaddafi regime is cunningly raising the spectre of Al-Qaeda. Disturbingly, foreign media are giving credence to the nonsense that a weakening of the Qaddafi regime corresponds with a strengthening of Al-Qaeda. Not only is this assessment incorrect but the opposite may well be the case unless the rebel freedom fighters are helped by NATO on a sustained and co-ordinated basis.

Al-Qaeda is a military network which thrives in a vacuum as was illustrated in Afghanistan. The first really effective Al-Qaeda affiliate was the Taliban which took power in Afghanistan in 1996. The Taliban emerged as an organization in 1994 after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and the communist regime fell in February 1992. Due to internecine factional fighting within the post-1992 mujahideen
governments Afghanistan fell into a state of anarchy which subsequently enabled the Taliban to take power in 1994.

The Taliban basically emerged from Quranic schools along the Afghan-Pakistan border due to the backing of Pakistan’s superb military intelligence, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Due to the ISI’s own strategic objectives (which were not, and are not, always shared by successive governments in Islamabad) Pakistani military intelligence sought to exert its power through the Taliban. Indeed the American led fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan is still being undermined by elements within the ISI having links to this Al-Qaeda affiliate.

Due to the American led intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 it has become fashionable to assert that the more or less free world bungled by supporting the Afghan mujahideen because this set the scene for Al-Qaeda. In actual fact the problems that emerged in Afghanistan were due to the Americans and Europeans not maintaining close links with the post-communist Northern Alliance government in 1992 to encourage and support it holding democratic elections.

Osama Bin Laden had established guerrilla operations against the Soviets in the 1980s which initially and ironically supported by his home country, Saudi Arabia. (Saudi support for Bin Laden in Afghanistan was ironic because his ultimate aim of taking power in Saudi Arabia by destroying the royal House of Saud is now apparent) Bin Laden and what became his Al-Qaeda organization is distinctive for advocating the re-establishment of modern-day Caliphate in which Muslim countries re united into one Islamic state.

Having taken power in Afghanistan in 1996 the Taliban provided Bin Laden with a base for Al-Qaeda’s worldwide operations. The September 11th 2001 terrorist outrages were undertaken on the basis that if important headquarters such as the World Trade Centre in New York or the Pentagon in Washington were bombed then the West’s financial and defence capacities would be substantially impaired. This relatively simplistic approach not only demonstrated Al-Qaeda’s top-down mindset but also illustrated their methodology of creating chaos as a prelude to taking power.

Al-Qaeda has established viable operations in nations where anarchy is in the ascendant. A glaring example of the application of the Al-Qaeda model has being contemporary Somalia. This organization has also established operations in Yemen by linking up with remote tribes but Al-Qaeda has failed to establish an urban base of support which is a key political power source in that Gulf nation.

There are Libyan operatives within Al-Qaeda but the Qaddafi regime effectively closed Libya off from the rest of the world that this organization does not have a base in that country. Furthermore the Libyan people are too well-educated that they are not receptive to Al-Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam or its absolutist aims. Furthermore having lived under Qaddafi’s repressive rule the Libyan people are not be prepared to exchange one tyranny for another.

As simplistic as Al-Qaeda’s approaches are with regard to engineering anarchy this co-ordinated network has been meticulous in establishing organizational structures in the wake of a breakdown in law and order. In the Libyan context the anti-Qaddafi freedom revolt has been too spontaneous for Al-Qaeda to hi-jack the rebellion because it has no organization on the ground. However if there is a complete and sustained break down of law and order in Libya then Al-Qaeda could have the potential to link up with remote tribes to possibly constitute an effective fighting force.

Al-Qaeda could infiltrate operatives into Libya from The Sudan, Chad and Niger but the territorial terrain is too sparsely populated and inhospitably isolated to pose a threat. The Egyptian military have effective control along the Libyan border that an Al-Qaeda cannot infiltrate Libya. The Tunisian-Libyan border is also secure from Al-Qaeda infiltration because Tunisia is too cosmopolitan a nation for this network to have established a viable base of operations from which to infiltrate.

Potential Al-Qaeda opportunities for infiltration into Libya by sea are presently too difficult to undertake due to the American naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea in the Gulf of Sidra and along the Libyan coast. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda cannot utilize the port cities of Benghazi or Misrata as springboards to enter Libya because the people and governing authorities of these cities are too grateful to NATO.

The military situation may be inhospitable for Al-Qaeda to establish military operations but the ultimate protective guarantee against an Al-Qaeda presence is to prevent that Al-Qaeda strategic objective being achieved – anarchy. By NATO providing the TNC with military and logistical support to maintain a viable army this governing authority can prevent the possibility of Al-Qaeda from moving into the void that it needs to establish military operations in Libya.

The TNC has the support of the people of Free Libya because it is pursuing an objective that they are overwhelming supportive of – that of removing Qaddafi from power. The insistence of the TNC (which clearly reflects the desire of the people living in Free Libya and probably those still ruled over by the regime) that Qaddafi leave the country as a precondition to negotiating the formation of a provisional government may seem intransigent.

The seemingly elaborate ‘Jamahiriya’ edifice that Qaddafi has constructed is actually based a round himself. Libyans know that if Qaddafi physically departs into exile that the regime will lose its co-ordinating capacity that holdover officials will be open to accepting a new provisional government that will protect them.

Due to his centralized role within the regime Qaddafi is not cawed by the popular revolt but actually emboldened to crush the rebellion. It is therefore wishful thinking on the part of foreign governments to believe that Qaddafi will be overthrown by defectors within his entourage.

The challenge therefore will be for the principal NATO countries of the United States, Great Britain and France that are hopefully at the forefront of removing Qaddafi from power to commit to supporting the rebel freedom fighters to achieve this objective. NATO is in a position to help arm and train the TNC’s brave embryonic volunteer army. Rebel freedom fighters can be trained and armed in Benghazi and then shipped to secure Misrata. This port city can in turn serve as a base from which to despatch a NATO trained and equipped army to liberate Tripoli.

Due to Qaddafi’s intransigence a march from Misrata to Tripoli could be bloody. To avoid a protracted war focused NATO air support will be required to incapacitate Qaddafi’s ground troops so that there can be an expeditious rebel march on Tripoli. Because Qaddafi is actually militarily skilled he will know that NATO air and logistical support will be sufficient to enable the rebel freedom fighters to eventually win victory. If this is to be the case Qaddafi (and key members of his entourage) will be faced with the prospect of deciding whether to cede power to a provisional government or fighting to the death. The latter option will be a challenge for the Qaddafi regime because there are too many ultimately unreliable paid mercenaries fighting for his regime.

If NATO does opt to provide the Libyan rebel freedom fighters with effective assistance Qaddafi could well cede power to a provisional government and go into exile. If Qaddafi insists on staying on in Libya the TNC should be open to such a scenario on the strict condition that an international force is deployed to enforce the authority of a new provisional government.

Paradoxically, such an international force would provide protection to former regime officials and supporters from arrest or retribution in for an intermediary period until democratic elections are held. If the Qaddafi regime does have a substantial degree of genuine support this could be parlayed into electoral leverage so that figures associated with the regime can fulfil a political role within a post-Qaddafi Libya.

Alternatively, if Qaddafi knows that NATO will not provide the rebel freedom fighters with necessary and sufficient support he will maintain his military advantage by holding the territory to perpetuate the division of Libya. Such western indifference will lead to a counterproductive malaise in the Middle East because failures of Arab nations to make transitions to democracy will be conducive to facilitating failed nation states and more war in a resource vital part of the world.

Dr. David Bennett is the Director of Social Action Australia Pty Ltd.